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THEY FIGHT TO PROTECT OUR RIGHTS; SHOULDN'T
WE DO THE SAME FOR THEM? INTRAMILITARY
IMMUNITY IN LIGHT OF UNITED STATES v. STANLEY
INTRODUCTION
Thus the building sits beside the river.
Far away in a placid sea the island sits in the sun.
No one has ever associated the island with Death.
But Death is on the way.
And with it, the Building must somehow cope.'
So begins Allen Drury's novel of the Pentagon, the formidable structure
from which United States military decisions ultimately emanate. But, unfor-
tunately, the careers of United States enlisted persons can also begin threatened
by an impending cloud of death as a result of the Supreme Court's recent
decision in United States v. Stanley2 which held that no recovery should be
given to a soldier who been unwittingly used in an Army drug experiment.
The view of the military as a separate entity with a distinct judicial system,
necessarily set apart because of its combat mission,3 has led to a tenuous
relationship between the military and civilian lawmakers.4 But the legal com-
1. A. DRuRY, PENTAooN 8 (1986).
2. 107 S. Ct. 3054 (1987).
3. See, e.g., Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953) ("Mhe rights of men in the armed
forces must perforce be conditioned to meet certain overriding demands of discipline and duty
.... "). See also Barker, Military Law-A Separate System of Jurisprudence, 36 U. CN. L. REv.
223 (1967); Hirschhorn, The Separate Community: Military Uniqueness and Servicemen's Consti-
tutional Rights, 62 N.C.L. Rv. 177, 253 (1984) (judiciary accepts "separate community" rationale
for reasons of "efficacy and political supremacy"); Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military,
37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 181 (1962). Chief Justice Warren explained that the "Thou Shalt Nots" of
the Bill of Rights, which afford constitutional protection to all individuals, must compete with
the military necessity argument. Id. at 186. He believed that the Supreme Court lets the military
win this competition by adhering to the "hands off" attitude established in Ex Parte Vallandigham,
68 U.S. (I Wall) 243 (1863), which held that civilian courts do not have jurisdiction to review
decisions made by military courts. Id. at 187.
4. See Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 41-42 (1976) ("hands off" policy applied); Kennedy
v. United States, 258 F: Supp. 967 (D. Kan. 1966), aff'd, 377 F.2d 339 (10th Cir. 1967). In
Kennedy, plaintiff had requested that either a military or civilian attorney be appointed to defend
him in his courts-martial hearing, and had supported this request with an affidavit attesting to
his indigence. Id. The military denied his request, concluding that counsel was not readily available.
Id. The district court affirmed the military's decision, holding that civilian trials are distinct from
courts-martial, and as such there was no sixth amendment right to counsel. Id. at 970. See also
Fratcher, Review by the Civil Courts of Judgments of Federal Military Tribunals, 10 O~fo ST.
L.J. 271 (1949) (Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction does not extend to review of judgments
by military tribunals).
128 DEPA UL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:127
munity's discomfort with involvement in military affairs' should not force an
enlisted person to relinquish all rights upon entering the service. In light of
the Supreme Court's decisions protecting constitutional rights in other con-
texts,' this expansive denial of personal rights in the military setting is inde-
fensible. 7
The recent decisions concerning the military are influenced by the doctrine
set forth in Feres v. United States,8 which bars statutory recovery for enlisted
persons, and by the competing doctrine set forth in Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents,9 which recognizes recovery for a violation of a person's
constitutional rights. The Supreme Court's attempt to reconcile these two
competing doctrines in Chappell v. Wallace,10 where Bivens recovery was
denied, forms the basis for the Stanley decision. The Stanley decision interprets
Feres, Bivens and Chappell and holds that "no Bivens remedy is available for
injuries that 'arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service.""'
Stanley's expansive reading of Chappell bars recovery in virtually all cases,
thereby extinguishing any claims for damages by enlisted persons who have
suffered constitutional violations at the hands of the military.
In order to analyze the Stanley holding properly, this Casenote will first
address the historical development of the various immunity doctrines, starting
with the doctrine of sovereign immunity, moving through the doctrine of
qualified immunity for governmental officials and the role of Bivens in any
discussion of qualified immunity,' 2 and ending with an explanation of how
5. See Sherman, Legal Inadequacies and Doctrinal Restraints in Controlling the Military, 49
IND. L.J. 539 (1974). Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 (1953), was the first case to articulate
that the military operates separately from the civilian sector, a belief that the judiciary has adhered
to in subsequent cases. Id. at 541.
6. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)
(school could not ban wearing of black armbands to protest the United States' involvement in
Vietnam because first amendment freedom of expression rights would be violated); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to privacy recognized under the fifth, ninth, and fourteenth
amendments and the penumbras surrounding the Bill of Rights); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398 (1963) (Seventh Day Adventists, who chose not to work on Saturday for religious reasons,
were entitled to unemployment compensation).
7. See generally Warren, supra note 3, at 191-94 (servicemen give up some rights upon
entering the military but can not be expected to surrender all constitutional protections).
8. 340 U.S. 135 (1950). The Feres doctrine states: "Mhe Government is not liable under the
Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the
course of activity incident to service." Id. at 146.
9. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). In Bivens, the Court held that there was a "cause of action under
the fourth amendment" for a violation of petitioner's constitutional rights by federal agents. Id.
at 397.
10. 462 U.S. 296 (1983). In Chappell, the Court held that "[ejnlisted military personnel
may not maintain a suit to recover damages from a superior officer for alleged constitutional
violations." Id. at 305.
11. 107 S. Ct. at 3063.
12. The Bivens case created the constitutional tort cause of action by allowing an individual
to recover against government officials for an illegal search and seizure. 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971).
The opinion limited its holding to only the cause of action question, but its principles have been
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these doctrines apply to the military. The focus will then move away from
the immunity doctrines and address the unique nature of constitutional torts
and the regulations prohibiting human experimentation. Finally, this Casenote
will propose an alternate remedy for resolving the intramilitary tort problem.
The objective of this alternate remedy is to strike a proper balance between
the individual's interest in seeking redress against those who violate their rights
and the military's interest in autonomy from the civilian legal system."
I. BACKGROUND
A. Sovereign Immunity
The question of whether or not the United States Government as an entity
and/or its officials should be liable for their actions has plagued our judicial
and legislative systems throughout history. Historically, protection for the
government was based on the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity., 4
Sovereign immunity was absolute, defeating suits at their commencement for
lack of jurisdiction." Traditionally, governmental immunity from liability was
justified by the theory that the government itself granted rights to the people
and, therefore, could not be held liable for infringing on the rights that it
controlled.' 6 Today, however, the sovereign immunity doctrine is not as well
accepted as it once was and, although still supported by some courts and
commentators,' it is highly criticized by others as obsolete and inequitable.' 8
heavily relied on in subsequent immunity cases. See also Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 486
(1978) (Bivens principles were used in analyzing whether immunity should be given). See infra
notes 41, 61-64 and accompanying text.
13. See Stanley, 107 S. Ct. at 3066 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
14. Pound, The Tort Claims Act: Reason or History?, 30 NACCA L.J. 404, 406-09 (1964)
(common law doctrine of sovereign immunity was premised on belief that the King could do no
wrong).
15. See Burgess, Official Immunity and Civil Liability for Constitutional Torts Committed
By Military Commanders After Butz v. Economou, 89 Mn.. L. REv. 25, 27 n.7 (1980) (suits
against government are blocked "at [their] inception" for lack of jurisdiction).
16. Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907) ("IThere can be no legal right as
against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.").
17. See, e.g., Carter v. Colson, 447 F.2d 358, 365-66 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (governing bodies
should not be hampered by fear of damage suits), rev'd. on other grounds sub nom. District of
Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1978). See generally F. HARPER & F. JAMS, TmE LAW OF
TORTS 1611-12 (1956) (satisfying privilege claims against state would be too great a drain on public
funds).
18. See, e.g., Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 318, 319-20 (1957) (Congress felt that
it was in nation's best interest to impose liability on United States under Federal Tort Claims
Act). See also Note, From Feres to Stencel: Should Military Personnel Have Access to FTCA
Recovery?, 77 MicH. L. REy. 1099 (1979) [hereinafter Note, FTCA Recovery] (Federal Tort
Claims Act should be extended to military claims). See generally K. DAvis, Arm ,sTmArvaE LAWS
OF rHE SEvENass, ch. 25 (1979) (legislature and judiciary are dismantling sovereign immunity).
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B. The Federal Tort Claims Act
The sovereign immunity doctrine was severely curtailed in 1946 when Con-
gress passed the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA").19 The FTCA's primary
purpose was to extend a remedy to those injured by the government who
previously had been denied the right to seek recovery. 20 The FTCA accom-
plished this purpose by allowing suits for money damages to be brought
against the government for the negligent or wrongful acts of its employees in
situations where private liability would occur. 2' The FTCA created this liability
by expanding the jurisdiction of the federal district courts to allow them to
hear such claims," not by creating new causes of action. Claims that are not
substantial enough to be recognized by law still are dismissed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.2
The FTCA did not create blanket liability for the government; indeed it
listed certain exceptions where government immunity was not waived. 24 One
of these exceptions involves the military context, and is specifically tailored
to combat situations." Absent any other definitive guidelines in the statutory
language, the courts were left to discern whether or not the FTCA should
apply to all situations arising in the military setting.
19. Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946, 60 stat. 842 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 28 U.S.C.).
20. Feres, 340 U.S. at 140 (FTCA marked culmination of long effort to mitigate sovereign
immunity's unjust consequences). Accord United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543 (1951).
Since under the FTCA the United States had consented to be sued, the Yellow Cab Court required
that the United States be impleaded as a third party defendant. Id. at 544. The Court concluded
that the FTCA was reflective of a general trend toward increasing the scope of the United States'
waiver of its sovereign immunity from suit. Id. at 550. See also United States v. Aetna Casualty
& Sur. Co., 338 U.S. 366 (1949) (Court allowed insurance company to bring suit in its own name
against United States upon its claim that it had become subrogated by payment to insured person
who individually would have been able to bring such an action against United States); Note,
FTCA Government Liability for Personal Injuries to Military Personnel, 51 J. Ant L. & COM.
1087, 1089 (1985-86) [hereinafter Note, Government Liability] (FTCA attempted to provide relief
to individuals for wrongs inflicted by government).21. "The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title relating to tort
claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances,
..... 28 U S C. § 2674 (1982). See also Feres, 340 U.S. at 141.
The Act grants federal courts jurisdiction over claims against the United States for money
damages "for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or
wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of
his office or employment under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would
be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982).
22. Feres, 340 U.S. at 140-41.
23. Id. at 141. ("[The FTCA] does not say that all claims must be allowed.").
24. Note, FTCA Recovery, supra note 18, at 1118 (immunity is not waived for claims arising
in foreign countries, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k); from combatant activities, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j); and
from intentional torts of government employees, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h)).
25. "The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to-.. . ti) Any claim arising out of the
combatant activities of the military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war."
28 U.S.C. § 2680(j) (1982).
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Shortly after the FTCA was enacted, the Supreme Court addressed the
FTCA's application to the military in Feres v. United States.2 There, the
Court created a judicial exception to FTCA liability by holding that the
government is not liable under the FTCA for servicemen's injuries which arise
out of or are in the course of activity "incident to service. ",2 7 The pivotal fact
in Feres, and its two companion cases, was that the enlistees' injuries, inflicted
by other servicemen, arose in the course of military duty.2 Since the Court
could not discern any American law which allowed a serviceman to recover
from the military for negligence, 29 it was hesitant to create novel and unprec-
edented liabilities.10 Recovery was denied.
The Feres decision failed to define the term "incident to service," leaving
the lower courts free to decide how broadly this judicial exception to FTCA
liability should be interpreted," and commentators free to criticize or laud the
decision. 2 The Supreme Court attempted to remedy this confusion in Brown
v. United States,33 another enlisted person's claim for recovery under the
FTCA. In Brown, the Court followed Feres and denied recovery. The Court
relied on two rationales: 1) the necessity of fostering a unique relationship
between soldiers and superiors; and, 2) the necessity of maintaining discipline
26. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
27. Id. at 146 (emphasis added).
28. Id. Feres was granted certiorari with Jefferson v. United States, 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir.
1949), and Griggs v. United States, 178 F.2d I (10th Cir. 1949). In each case the Court held that
the government was not liable under the FTCA for injuries which arose out of or in the course
of activity incident to service. 340 U.S. at 146. But see Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49
(1949) (recovery granted because Brooks was on furlough). The Feres Court distinguished Brooks
by concluding that activity while on furlough was not activity incident to service. Feres, 340 U.S.
at 146.
29. Feres, 340 U.S. at 141. The Feres Court did, however, distinguish Wilkes v. Dinsman, 48
U.S. (12 How.) 89 (1849), and Weaver v. Ward, Hobart 135, 80 Eng. Rep. 284 (1616), as
intentional torts cases, and, therefore, different from the case at hand. 340 U.S. at 141, n.10.
30. Id. at 142.
31. Compare Hass v. United States, 518 F.2d 1138 (4th Cir. 1975) and Henninger v. United
States, 473 F.2d 814 (9th Cir.) (absolutist rule applied to bar claim under FTCA when serviceman
would not have been injured but for fact that he was on active duty), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 819
(1973); with Zoula v. United States, 217 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1954) ("incident to service" is determined
by whether serviceman was on or off base at time of injury). Other courts have attempted to
redefine the "incident to service" rule to serve the needs of justice as they see fit. See Downes v.
United States, 249 F. Supp. 626, 628-29 (E.D.N.C. 1965) (court created new focus for applying
Feres principles); Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 320 (1957) ("There is no
justification for this Court to read exceptions into the Act beyond those provided by Congress.")
(citing United States v. Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co., 328 U.S. 366, 383 (1949)).
32. Most commentators have criticized the decision. See, e.g., Hitch, The Federal Tort Claims
Act and Military Personnel, 8 RuwoERs L. Ray. 316 (1954) (Court in effect added exception to
FTCA which discriminates against certain servicemen). But see Burgess, supra note 15, at 45 n.101
(author notes reaffirmation of Feres doctrine in Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431
U.S. 666 (1977)).
33. 739 F.2d 362 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 904 (1985).
1989]
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in the armed forces.- The Court felt that subjecting the military to unprece-
dented liability would adversely affect both of these considerations, thus
resulting in a decrease in military effectiveness.
Although the rationales articulated in Brown seemed defensible, the contin-
ued viability of the Feres doctrine was questioned in certain lower courts. 5
Nevertheless, others courts applied the doctrine with a vengeance. 3 6 Despite
this split, the Feres doctrine is very much alive today because of the Supreme
Court's conclusions in Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States.17 Although
the suit was brought by a third party manufacturer seeking indemnity for
damages it might be required to pay a serviceman for his injuries received
after the manufacturer's equipment malfunctioned, the Court nevertheless
relied on the Feres bar to FTCA recovery."8 The Court stated that the Feres
bar should apply to both third parties and servicemen since the effect on
military discipline would be the same in either situation.3 9 The primacy of
military discipline and the need to prevent second-guessing of military orders
were of utmost importance in the Stencel decision.4° Up to this point, the
question of what role the Feres doctrine would play in light of the concurrent
developments of the doctrine of qualified immunity for government officials
and of the doctrine of recovery for constitutional tort violations remained
unanswered.
34. "The peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors, the effects of
the maintenance of such suits on discipline, and the extreme results that might obtain
if suits under the Tort Claims Act were allowed for negligent orders given or negligent
acts committed in the course of military service, led the [Feres] Court to read that
Act -as excluding claims of character."
Id. at 365 (quoting United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112 (1954)).
35. See United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 (1963) (Feres doctrine does not extend to federal
prisoners' claims for negligence on the part of prison officials); Rayonier, Inc. v. United States,
352 U.S. 315 (1957) (government held liable under FTCA for negligent fire fighting by United
States Forest Service); Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955) (FTCA recovery
allowed for Coast Guard's negligent operation of lighthouse).
36. See Note, Stencel Aero Engineering Corporation v. United States: An Expansion of the
Feres Doctrine to Include Military Contractors, Subcontractors, and Suppliers, 29 HAS'nGS L.J.
1217, 1218-19 (1973). The author cites cases where a broad interpretation of "incident to service,"
leading to a Feres ban on recovery, included, activities such as a drowning in a base pool while
swimming. Id. at 1219 (citing Chambers v. United States, 357 F.2d 224 (8th Cir. 1966)).
37. 431 U.S. 666 (1977). See also United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52 (1985) (recovery barred
by Feres doctrine). But see Johnson v. United States, 749 F.2d 1530 (11th Cir. 1985) (analysis of
case facts must be done to see if they are sufficiently similar to Feres).
38. 431 U.S. at 673 (factors considered by Feres applicable to Stencel facts).
39. Id. at 673-74.
40. Id. at 673. See also Donaldson, Constitutional Torts and Military Effectiveness: Proposed
Alternatives to the Feres Doctrine, 23 A.F.L. Rav. 171, 185 (1982-83) (courts are genuinely
reluctant to interfere with military affairs because of disciplinary concerns); Miller, Liability and
Relief of Government Contractors for Injuries to Service Members, 104 Mn.. L. REv. 1, 10 (1984)
(allowing suits by military personnel would erode discipline).
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C. Immunity For Individual Government Officials
Today, individual government officials enjoy only qualified immunity. 4'
This immunity standard is the product of a long line of cases, including Bivens,
which, while not formally specifying a qualified immunity standard, is viewed
as one of the more important cases in this area.42 As the following analysis
will show, the qualified immunity doctrine reflects an attempt to develop a
standard which would adequately protect individual officials while allowing
these same public officials the flexibility necessary to perform their duties
effectively.
Because the traditional doctrine of sovereign immunity was directed toward
protecting the Crown or other government entities, government officials had
to look elsewhere for protection.4 3 Initially, they were afforded little protection
for their actions." Essentially, the demarcation was between errors made while
acting within the scope of the official's authority, which did not subject the
official to liability, and errors made while acting without official authority,
which did subject the official to liability.45 But this distinction was essentially
a facade. The courts, by manipulating certain analytical factors, repeatedly
imposed liability even though the officials appeared to be acting within the
scope of their authority."
By the late 1800's, a change was evident. 47 The Supreme Court began to
realize that although the maxim "no man is above the law" was an established
jurisprudential tenet," the competing need for government officials to exercise
41. In Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978), the Court concluded that all government
officials, state and federal, deserve only qualified immunity. Id. at 504.
42. The Butz holding resulted from a heavy emphasis on the Bivens principles. Id. at 485-86.
The Court explained the Bivens case facts, its holding therein, and agreed with the Second Circuit's
holding on remand. See infra notes 61-64 & 68-71 and accompanying text. See generally Euler,
Personal Liability of Military Personnel for Actions Taken in the Course of Duty, 113 Mn.. L.
REv. 137, 139 (1986) (qualified immunity creates legal defense for federal official if that official
can prove he acted reasonably under the circumstances, and did not knowingly violate clearly
established constitutional rights).
43. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
44. See Burgess, supra note 15, at 30 n.20 (nineteenth century courts offered very little
protection to government officials).
45. Id. Compare Kendall v. Stokes, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 87 (1845) (officials were not held liable
for good faith errors in judgment made while acting within scope of their authority); with Wilkes
v. Dinsman, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 89 (1849) (circumstances were found to support cause of action
and therefore liability).
46. Id.
47. See Bradley v. Fisher,-80 U.S. 335 (1871). In Bradley, the Court held that judges were
entitled to absolute immunity for their judicial acts even if such acts were in excess of their
jurisdiction or done out of malice. Id. at 351-52. But see Forrester v. White, 108 S. Ct 538 (1988)
(judges do not have absolute immunity for administrative, legislative or executive acts, only for
those acts which are within their judicial functions).
48. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506 (1978) (quoting United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196,
220 11882])). "All the officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures
of the law and are bound to obey it." Id.
1989]
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their discretionary functions without fear of negative consequences was also
an important concern.4 9 In 1896, the Supreme Court began to expand the
immunity doctrine, as a means to protect government officials, in cases such
as Spalding v. Vilas. 0 In Spalding, the Court extended absolute immunity to
the Postmaster General in a defamation suit, while refusing to consider the
propriety of his motives." Lower courts seized the Spalding holding and
extended absolute immunity to a diverse group of federal officials for a wide
range of injuries.,,
In 1959, the Supreme Court further expanded the immunity doctrine in
Barr v. Mateo.3 The Court held that lower echelon federal officials could
receive absolute immunity when acting within the outer perimeters of their
authority, regardless of whether their actions were maliciously motivated. 5
Consequently, after Barr, federal officials enjoyed absolute immunity from
suits for any common law tort provided that: 1) the official was exercising a
discretionary function;5' and, 2) the official was acting within the boundaries
of his statutory authority3 The Court afforded more weight to the government
officials' interests in unfettered performance than to the public's interest in
obtaining redress for wrongs committed by government officials. By clothing
federal officials with absolute immunity when acting within the scope of their
49. See Bradley, 80 U.S. at 347 (judicial system will not operate properly if judicial officers
must live in fear of consequences of suits brought against them).
50. 161 U.S. 483 (1896).
51. Id. at 499 (motive that compelled federal official to act is wholly immaterial).
52. See, e.g., Standard Nut Margarine Co. v. Mellon, 72 F.2d 557 (D.C. Cir.) (Secretary and
Assistant Secretary of Treasury are immune), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 605 (1934); Jones v. Kennedy,
121 F.2d 40 (D.C. Cir.) (SEC employees are immune), cert. denied. 314 U.S. 665 (1941);
Papagianakis v. The Samos, 186 F.2d 257 (4th Cir. 1950) (immigration officials are immune),
cert. denied, 341 U.S. 92 (1951).
53. 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
54. Id. at 569-76. The Barr plurality recognized that two conflicting concerns had to be
addressed: individual citizen's rights had to be protected against oppressive action by the federal
government, and the public interest had to be protected by shielding government officials against
vindictive or ill founded suits. Id. at 565. The Court concluded that government policies must be
vigorously and effectively administered. Id. at 576. Such a need was seen as a substantial enough
public interest to mandate that government officials be given more protection than individuals.
Id. at 572-73. See also Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2nd Cir. 1949) ("In this instance,
it has been thought in the end better to leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers
than to subject those who try to do their duty to the constant dread of retaliation."), cert. denied,
339 U.S. 949 (1950).
55. See Westfall v. Erwin, 108 S. Ct. 580 (1988) (Court recognized need to protect those who
are exercising their discretionary powers from harassment); Note, Intramilitary Immunity and
Constitutional Torts, 80 MIcH. L. Rav. 312, 316 n.33 (1981) [hereinafter Note, Intramilitary
Immunity] (defines discretionary act by citing REsTATEMENT (SEcoDro) oF Toars § 895 D(3)(a) &
Comment b (1965), and W. PRossER, HANDBOOK or THm LAw Or TORTS 988 (4th ed. 1971)).
56. See Barr, 360 U.S. at 575-76. The Barr Court held that when an officer is acting within
his powers, the occasion during which he is acting justifies the act. Id. at 575 (citation omitted).
The Barr Court further stated that it is not the title of the office but the duties entrusted to the
officer which provide guidelines for delineating the immunity which clothes the official acts of
the executive officer Id. at 573-74.
[Vol. 38:127
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official duties, the Court believed that the officials could serve the public
more effectively.
Subsequent courts disagreed with this rationale, and the erosion of the
absolute immunity doctrine began.'7 This erosion, signaling a departure from
Spalding, was inevitable because absolute immunity had failed to accommodate
the numerous competing interests adequately. On the one hand, the courts
had to be mindful of any injustices that might result from subjecting officials
to liability for simply performing their required duties. Also, a very real danger
existed that the constant threat of personal liability would stifle the officials'
desire to exercise their discretionary powers fully. 8 On the other hand, the
courts had to be mindful of any injustice wrought by not compensating the
individual citizen for federal officials' tortious conduct.' 9 An unlimited grant
of absolute immunity ignored the individual's interest in redress, and seriously
eroded basic constitutional rights.
The absolute immunity doctrine was further curtailed in Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents.60 In Bivens, the Court held that the fourth amend-
ment created an implied cause of action for a private citizen's damage suit
against federal officers who had engaged in an illegal search and seizure. 6'
Thus, the constitutional tort claim against individual government officials was
born. The Bivens Court, however, did not specifically address the immunity
issue, choosing instead to limit its holding to the recognition of a federal cause
of action for damages.62 The opinion did list two situations in which a
57. See Black v. United States, 534 F.2d 524 (2nd Cir. 1976) (agency heads no longer have
absolute immunity); Mark v. Groff, 521 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1975) (public interests sufficiently
protected by according officials only qualified immunity); States Marine Lines, Inc. v. Schultz,
498 F.2d 1146 (4th Cir. 1974) (remanded for further fact-finding on immunity issue).
58. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
59. See Note, Government Immunity and Liability-Armed Forces-Government Officials
Charged with Violating Servicemen's FWfth Amendment Rights Not Entitled to Absolute Immu-
nity-Jaffe v. United States, No. 79-1543 (3d Cir. Feb. 20, 1980), 11 SEroN HALL L. REv. 275,
279 (1980). There are three arguments for imposing liability: 1) absolute immunity takes away
from constitutional protections; 2) federal officials have greater authority and therefore have a
greater potential for lawlessness; and 3) constitutional rights must be vindicated. Id. See also supra
note 48.
60. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
61. Id. at 397. Bivens arose after FBI agents made a warrantless entry into petitioner's
apartment, searched the apartment and arrested him on narcotics charges. Id. at 389. Petitioner
alleged that the arrest was made without probable cause. Id. The district court dismissed petitioner's
damages suit on alternative grounds: 1) the complaint failed to state a federal cause of action;
and, 2) respondents were immune from suit by virtue of their official positions. Id. at 390. The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed on the first ground alone. Id. The Supreme
Court reversed and remanded on the first ground, holding that petitioner's complaint stated a
federal cause of action under the fourth amendment for which damages were recoverable. Id. at
397.
62. Id. at 397-98. See also Gilden, The Standard of Culpability in Section 1983 and Bivens
Actions: The Prima Facie Case, Qual ied Immunity and the Constitution, 11 HosrA L. Rv.
557, 619 (1983) [hereinafter Note, The Standard of Culpability] (rather than address immunity,
Supreme Court remanded the issue to the Second Circuit).
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constitutional cause of action would be barred: 1) where special factors
counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative congressional action exist;
and, 2) where a congressional remedy explicitly declared to be a substitute for
constitutional recovery, and viewed as equally effective, exists. 6a Because these
situations were set forth only in dicta, it remained to be seen if they would
affect subsequent cases. It also remained to be seen if the Supreme Court
would follow the Second Circuit's Bivens analysis which, on remand from the
Supreme Court, specifically addressed the immunity issue and held that federal
agents were entitled to qualified immunity based on a good faith, reasonable
belief test. 6"
While the Bivens Court was creating a constitutional cause of action,
other courts were narrowing the scope of immunity for state officials. In
Scheuer v. Rhodes,65 state officials were granted only qualified immunity for
their acts. The burden was on the officials to demonstrate that their actions
were "in good faith and reasonabl[e] in light of all the circumstances as they
appeared at the time." 66 Scheuer created a fluid concept, granting varying
degrees of qualified immunity to state officials based on the nature of the
officials' responsibilities, and the circumstances at the time. 6 As a result, state
officials found themselves exposed to a greater degree of liability than federal
officials. The direct evaluation of the immunity principles in Scheuer, resulting
in qualified immunity for state officials, complemented the constitutional cause
of action created in Bivens. It was now time for the courts to reconcile the
developing lines of federal and state immunity and form one workable im-
munity doctrine.
The reconciliation of the state and federal immunity doctrines occurred in
Butz v. Economou." The Supreme Court held that there was no justification
63. Id. at 396. See also Note, Rethinking Sovereign Immunity After Bivens, 57 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 597 (1982) [hereinafter Note, Rethinking Immunity]. In regard to the second exception, the
author stressed that a "cause of action will survive unless Congress has enacted an alternative
remedy that the Court views as equally effective." Id. at 641 (emphasis in original). The author
went on to conclude that FTCA recovery is not an adequate replacement under the second
exception criterion. Id. at 652-53. In regard to the first exception, the author identified some
factors that should be evaluated to determine whether special factors counselling hesitation are
present: 1) concerns about the manageability of the cause of action; 2) explicit constitutional
barriers; and, 3) countervailing constitutional principles. Id. at 654. In conclusion, he stated that
none of these factors are really sufficient reasons to bar damages remedies. Id. at 666.
64. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 456 F.2d 1339, 1341 (2nd Cir. 1969).
65. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1973).
66. Id. at 247. In Scheuer, section 1983 claims were brought against state officials after the
Kent State University shooting incident. Id. at 234. Petitioners alleged that they were deprived of
their federal rights under the color of state law, so they demanded personal liability for the named
defendants. Id. at 238.
67. Id. at 247. See Note, The Standard of Culpability, supra note 62, at 583 (Scheuer introduced
a combination of subjective-official's good faith belief in the legality of the actions,-and
objective-the reasonable grounds for that beief,-as the basis for determining which level of
immunity should apply).
68. 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
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for distinguishing between suits brought against state officials and suits brought
against federal officials.6 In so doing, the opinion provided extensive guidance
for the lower courts. Federal and state officials were now to be judged on an
equal basis, both warranting only qualified immunity against suits for damages.
The Court accomplished this unification by explaining the development of the
immunity doctrines, extending the Scheuer holding to federal as well as state
officials, and affirming the Second Circuit's Bivens' holding that the standards
against which qualified immunity is to be judged are good faith and reason-
ableness. 70 With Butz, qualified immunity became the accepted standard on
both the state and federal levels.
Evidence of this acceptance was found in the Davis v. Passman decision, 7
where a congressman was held liable for damages under the fifth amendment
equal protection clause after discriminating against a female employee. Federal
officials could no longer hide behind a veil of absolute immunity while they
infringed upon individual rights. Instead, the correct method to decide these
cases now involved analyzing the situation to determine whether it fell into
one of the exceptions to qualified immunity. Absolute immunity would apply
only if the situation fell into one of the narrow exceptions enumerated in
Bivens.72
69. Id. at 500. In Butz, respondent, a commodity futures commission enterprise controller,
sued petitioners, Department of Agriculture officials, for damages, alleging a'violation of his
constitutional rights. Id. at 480. Specifically, respondent claimed that these officials had instituted
an investigation and an administrative proceeding against him because he had criticized the
Department of Agriculture. Id. The district court dismissed the action, granting the federal officials
absolute immunity. Id. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that defendants were entitled to
only qualified immunity, as were their state counterparts. Id. The Supreme Court granted certiorari
to address the immunity doctrine question. Id. at 480-81.
70. The Supreme Court rejected the view that all federal officials are absolutely immune from
damages liability. Butz, 438 U.S. at 485. The Court supported its conclusion by tracing the
development of immunity since Marbury v. Madison, I Cranch 137, 163 (1803) ("the very essence
of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the
laws"). Id. The Court analyzed the Supreme Court's holding in Bivens, which had created a
constitutional cause of action for damages, and the Second Circuit's holding on remand which
had concluded that the public interest is best served when officials enjoy only qualified immunity,
and found both conclusions to be sound. Id. at 486. The Court also traced the development of
state officials' qualified immunity. Id. at 496-98. After this informative journey through the
immunity principles, the Court concluded that, absent congressional directions to the contrary,
federal and state officials should enjoy the same degree of immunity. Id. at 504.
71. 442 U.S. 228 (1979). In Davis, which involved a sex discrimination suit brought against a
United States congressman, the Court concluded that petitioner had presented a valid cause of
action, thereby establishing a right to seek a damages remedy under the fifth amendment. Id. at
234-44. The Court concluded that the equal protection component of the fifth amendment's due
process clause conferred a federal constitutional right on petitioner. Id. The Court found that a
congressman was as liable as any other person for constitutional violations. Id. at 244. See infra
note 156.
72. Cf. id. at 248-49. After a thorough analysis of the facts, the Court concluded that a cause
of action under the fifth amendment existed which could be redressed by a damages remedy. See
also Note, Rethinking Immunity, supra note 63, at 625 (even though comprehensive employment
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D. The Application Of The Immunity Doctrines To The Military
With the affirmation of Bivens in the Butz decision, it appeared that the
immunity question was settled, and therefore, its application to the military
would be an easy extension of an accepted principle. This was not the case.
As noted earlier, the Bivens court specifically listed two situations where a
constitutional cause of action would be barred: 1) where special factors exist;
or, 2) where an adequate alternative remedy exists. 7 These two situations, set
forth in dicta, have proven to be a major roadblock to the direct application
of the Bivens doctrine in the military context.
1. Special factors counselling hesitation
The Bivens Court's failure to define the exceptions to the recovery that it
had created resulted in confusion among the lower courts. The first exception
to Bivens recovery, "special factors counseling hesitation," was particularly
troublesome in relation to intramilitary tort suits.74 On the one hand, some
saw the military as a totally separate society with a unique mission. In this
scenario, recruits were expected to surrender certain constitutional rights upon
entering the military as a means to further the military's particularized need
for internal discipline. 7 The judiciary, accepting this separate community
concept, allowed the military court system to exist as an entity separate from
the civilian courts.76 The civilian courts were generally barred from interfering
with the military jurisprudential system." Military tribunals, governed by the
Uniform Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ"), 7s exercised independent control
over the military through a unique set of procedures which did not necessarily
mesh with the civilian judicial process. 79
discrimination statute protecting federal employees existed, Supreme Court found no evidence that
statute should foreclose alternative remedies, especially not the independent constitutional cause
of action under Bivens).
73. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
74. See Zillman, Intramilitary Tort Law: Incidence to Service Meets Constitutional Tort, 60
N.C.L. Ray. 489, 491, n.11 (1982) ("Intramilitary suit" is a term of art used to define any tort
suit in which: 1) plaintiff alleges harm has occurred during his tour of duty; and, 2) suit is brought
against individual military officials, the government or both).
75. See Goodrich, Denying Soldiers the Rights They Flght to Protect, 2 CAusF. LAW. 48, 50
(Nov. 1982) (Col. John Henry Wigmore, when asked, stated, "The primary objective of the
military organization is victory, not justice.").
76. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
77. See Barker, supra note 3, at 226-27 (federal courts generally may not interfere with
established system of military jurisprudence).
78. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1970). The UCMJ was passed by Congress in 1950 and was
recognized as Congress's effort to insure that military justice was administered in accord with due
process demands.
79. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Commandant, U.S. Disciplinary Barracks, 258 F. Sup p. 967 (D.
Kan. 1966). The facts, which are undisputed, showed that the accused had requested that either
a military or a civilian lawyer be appointed to represent him in his two courts-martial proceedings.
Id. at 968. But the court, rather than follow Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), and Gideon
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Attempting to carry this separate system theory one step further, the theory's
proponents urged that the recognized needs for military discipline and internal
order were "special factors counselling hesitation."s ° As such, they contended
that military officers deserved absolute immunity for their acts or omissions
performed in the course of their military duties. The military feared that suits
brought by subordinates against their superiors would undermine the prompt
and unquestioning obedience required in the military context."' Also present
was the fear that suits by members of the same unit would undermine morale
and decrease the unit's fighting effectiveness.12 The courts, including the
Supreme Court, accepted these rationales and granted considerable discretion
to military judgments.0
On the other hand were those who believed that the special factors coun-
selling hesitation were just that-discrete factors occurring in a limited range
of situations." These commentators, who felt that the separate system doctrine
was overextended, pointed to the FTCA's language which bars government
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), which guarantee sixth amendment due process rights,
specifically distinguished those cases as not applicable to the military sector. Id. at 969-70.
Therefore, although the sixth amendment provides for a right to counsel, this right was not
extended to the military situation, and no counsel was appointed. Id. at 970. See generally Barker,
supra note 77, at 223; Howland, The Hands-Off Policy and Intramilitary Tots, 71 IowA L. REv.
93 (1985) (separate systems is valid theory).
80. Most of the supporters of this theory are writers who are affiliated with the military. See,
e.g., Donaldson, supra note 40, at 184-85 (distinctly unique relationship between soldiers and
government is of primary importance).
81. See Goodrich, supra note 75, at 50 (military believes that internalized discipline is required
at all times since attitudes developed in traiqing must be such that they will be conducive to
voluntary and willful obedience on battlefield). See also Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743-44
(1974); Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 94 (1953) (immediate compliance to orders must be
reflexive in order to assure combat readiness).
82. See Goodrich, supra note 75, at 50 (argument is essentially based on a floodgates theory,
whereby military believes that allowing one suit will lead to plethora of other suits). Contra
Howland, supra note 79, at 115. Howland cites M. JAowrrz, Sociowoy AND Tia MnmrARY
EsTALiswaN 19 (1965), which concluded that a soldier's combat effectiveness does not depend
on formal discipline but rather on group dynamics. Id. In addition, Howland believes that soldiers
are more motivated by the desire to prevent bodily harm than by the possibility of suits. Id. at
122.
83. See Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593 (1959); Jaffee v. United States, 663 F.2d 1226 (3rd
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 972 (1982); Martinez v. Schrock, 537 F.2d 765 (3d Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 430 U.S. 920 (1977); Hass v. United States, 518 F.2d 1138 (4th Cir. 1975); Tirrill v.
McNamara, 451 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1971) (per curiam); Bailey v. Dequevedo, 375 F.2d 72 (3rd
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 923 (1967); Sigler v. LeVan, 485 F. Supp. 185 (D. Md. 1980); Nagy
v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 383 (D.D.C. 1979); Thornwell v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 344
(D.D.C. 1979); Misko v. United States, 453 F. Supp. 513 (D.D.C. 1978); Birdwell v. Schlesinger,
403 F. Supp. 710 (D. Colo. 1975); Lewin v. United States, 403 F. Supp. 99 (D. Mass. 1975);
Moore v. Schlesinger, 384 F. Supp. 163 (D. Colo. 1974); Rotko v. Abrams, 338 F. Supp. 46 (D.
Conn. 1971), qfJ'd per curiam, 455 F.2d 992 (2d Cir. 1972); Downes v. United States, 249 F.
Supp. 626 (E.D.N.C. 1965); Gamage v. Peal, 217 F. Supp. 384 (N.D. Cal. 1962).
84. See generally Zillman, supra note 74, at 30 (Chappell substantially narrowed Feres and
established qualified immunity as the norm for federal officials).
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liability for claims "arising out of combatant activities ... during time of
war." The absence of statutory language creating an all-inclusive bar to
military liability, in the face of statutory language creating a bar to liability
for certain military activities, justified their conclusion that the special factors
doctrine should not be applied to every military situation. The commentators
argued that qualified immunity should be the norm, with recognized distinc-
tions between peacetime and combat situations.1 If the military officials could
prove that they were performing functions sufficiently related to national
security then absolute immunity should be given.87
The Supreme Court had an opportunity to define the "special factors"
exception in Chappell v. Wallace." In Chappell, enlisted military personnel
were denied recovery in a damages suit against a superior officer for alleged
constitutional violations.89 The Court's rationale in Chappell was unique be-
cause, although the claim involved a constitutional tort based on Bivens, the
Court relied on Feres and the FTCA, as its guiding principles.9 The Supreme
Court concluded that the separate system rationale was valid because of the
unique disciplinary structure of the military and because of Congress' unique
role in relation to the military establishment.
Rather than decisively conclude that the separate systems rationale bars all
recovery for military personnel, the Chappell Court left open the possibility
that some suits against the military might still be allowed. The Court accom-
plished this by stating that military personnel would not be barred from all
redress in civilian courts for constitutional wrongs suffered in the course of
85. See Garrison, Post Discharge Failure to Warn: A New Theory Allowing Access to FTCA
Recovery, 75 Ky. L.J. 159, 162 (1986-87) (there are two specified FTCA exceptions-any claim
arising out of combatant's service during wartime and any claim arising in foreign country). Cf.
Note, Government Liability, supra note 20, at 1091 (legislature left gap in FTCA when it failed
to address noncombatant claims).
86. See, e.g., Note, Government Liability, supra note 20, at 1087 (certain suits do not encroach
on military disciplinary structure).
87. See Tigue v. Swain, 585 F.2d 909 (8th Cir. 1978) (particularized analysis done to determine
whether immunity should be granted); Alvarez v. Wilson, 431 F. Supp. 136 (N.D. Ill. 1977)
(military necessity is not a justification for absolute immunity).
88. 462 U.S. 296 (1983).
89. Id. at 305. In Chappell, five enlisted Navy seamen brought a damages claim against their
superior officers. The enlisted men alleged that because they were minorities they were given poor
reviews and undesirable duties and were threatened. Id. at 297. They claimed a violation of their
constitutional rights against discrimination, and a violation of the 42 U.S.C. section 1985 prohi-
bitions against conspiracy. Id. The Southern District of California dismissed the complaint, but
the Ninth Circuit reversed, basing its holding on Bivens. Id. at 298. The Supreme Court granted
certiorari and reversed. Id. The Court used the analysis set forth in Feres as its guide, even though
this case was not concerned with statutory relief. Id. at 299. The Court concluded that the special
factors within a military setting, such as the unique disciplinary structure and Congress's activity
in the field, bar allowing a Bivens remedy in the military context. Id. at 304.
90. Id. at 299. It is important to note that the Court recognized Feres as a guiding principle,
not as a controlling principle. Id. Therefore, there was not a totally mixing of Feres statutory
FTCA claims and Bivens constitutional claims.
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military service." This language created a problem because courts were unsure
how broadly the Chappell holding, barring Bivens recovery for military per-
sonnel, was to be read. If the bar was narrow in scope, just how narrow was
it? Did it bar only those actions in which an adverse effect on the hierarchical
command structure would result,9e or only those actions in which Congress
had exercised its plenary constitutional authority?9 Or had the Chappell Court
envisioned a total bar, barring all actions for redress brought by enlisted
military personnel? By not taking a definitive position on these issues, the
Chappell Court left the lower courts free to decide claims on a case-by-case
basis.9
2. The alternate means of recovery
The second exception to recovery noted in Bivens was the existence of an
equally effective alternate compensation scheme specifically designated by
Congress as a replacement. 9 Earlier, the Feres Court had noted that such an
alternate scheme could exist in the Veterans Benefits Act ("VBA").9 The
VBA was enacted as a no-fault compensation scheme for injuries incurred by
soldiers in the course of their military duties, duties recognized as dangerous
91. Id. at 304. Some commentators thus believe that Chappell was a narrow decision, applicable
only to situations whose fact patterns are the same as that in Chappell. See generally Zillman,
supra note 74, at 33 (case did not end all possibilities of military commander being sued because,
even though dicta was sweeping, opinion itself was narrow). But see Trerice v. Summons, 755
F.2d 1081, 1084 (4th Cir. 1985) (Bivens recovery barred by intramilitary immunity); Mollnow v.
Carlton, 716 F.2d 627, 630 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100 (1984) (Chappell created
per se ban on Bivens actions by military).
92. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 300.
93. Id. at 301. Often times the problem lies in determining what exactly constitutes congres-
sional activity in the field. Compare Chappell, 462 U.S. 296 (1983) (this activity is evident in the
Constitution's grant of power over rights, duties and responsibilities of military to Congress); with
Jaffe, 663 F.2d 1226, 1227-28 (3rd Cir. 1981) (this activity requires some sort of financial
commitment, such as is evident in the VBA alternative remedies of free medical care and no-fault
limited compensation). Contra Donaldson, supra note 40, at 197 (VBA is inadequate replacement).
94. See Johnson v. United States, 749 F.2d 1530 (11th Cir. 1985). The Johnson court set
forth a thorough analysis of Feres, Bivens and Chappell. The court's primary focus during its
special factors analysis was on the unique need for discipline in a military setting, the existence
of military alternatives, and Congress's authority over the military. Id. at 1535. But see Gaspard
v. United States, 713 F.2d 1097, 1103 (1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 975 (1984) (courts can not
impose, or even inquire into, monetary damages for servicemen's injuries).
95. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396-97.
96. 38 U.S.C. §§ 301-62 (1976). See Feres, 340 U.S. at 145 (Court concluded that congressional
enactments, providing military with compensation for injuries or death, must be evaluated fully
before deciding whether damages remedy is warranted). The courts of appeal in the companion
cases on certiorari with Feres had addressed the alternative means of recovery issue. Id. at 145
(citing Jefferson v. United States, 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1950) and United States v. Griggs, Ex'x,
178 F.2d I (10th Cir. 1950)). In both of those cases, the enlistee had already recovered under the
Veterans' Administration programs. The Feres Court thus concluded that recovery under the
FTCA would be a double recovery and should not be allowed. Id.
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but necessary.Y Its purposes, as articulated in the Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp.
v. United States' opinion, were to provide swift, efficient compensation to
servicemen, and to place an upper limit on government liability.99 Thus, since
some courts and commentators believed that the VBA provided a viable
alternative to FTCA recovery, they also believed that the VBA would satisfy
the second Bivens exception.' ° ° But, as other commentators noted, VBA
recovery is limited recovery, and thus does not fall within the second Bivens
exception to recovery granted by the FTCA.10° These commentators believe
that the existence of the VBA in conjunction with the second exception no
more created a per se ban on recovery than does the first exception did. 102
Again, questions remained.
E. The Unique Nature Of Constitutional Tort Actions
As shown above, the Supreme Court's approach to suits against the military
evolved into a pattern of analysis which utilized portions of prior-albeit very
different-cases, such as Feres, Bivens, and Chappell, to justify its holdings. 03
Some commentators believed that the Court's method of combining a Feres
statutory action for a tortious violation, with a Bivens constitutional claim,
was invalid.1°4 Citing the Supreme Court's extensive recognition of the Bill of
97. See Note, Torts-Military Service Immunity-There is No Cause of Action Implied Under
the Constitution Against Government Officials for Intentional Constitutional Torts Occurring
Incident to Military Service, 27 VuL. L. Rav. 858, 869 (1981-82).
98. 431 U.S. 666 (1977).
99. Id. at 673.
100. See Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United States, 444 U.S. 460, 464 (1980) (per curiam) (in
dicta, Court said that proper reading of Stencel led to conclusion that veterans' benefits were the
exclusive remedy for injuries incurred by military). But see Schwartz, Making Intramilitary Tort
Law More Civil: A Proposed Reform of the Feres Doctrine, 95 Y.ua L.J. 992 (1986). The author
called the Hatzlachh dicta into question by referring to Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49
(1949), and United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110 (1954). Id. at 998, n.29. In Brooks the enlistees
received FTCA recovery because they were on furlough. The Court held that events which occurred
while on furlough were not "incident to service." Brooks, 337 U.S. at 50-51. In Brown, recovery
for post-discharge negligence was allowed, again under the not "incident to service" rationale.
Brown, 348 U.S. at 112. The author concluded that if veterans' benefits were held to be an
exclusive remedy for injured servicemen, then Brown and Brooks would have to be overruled.
Schwartz, at 998 n.29.
101. See Note, F/CA Recovery, supra note 18, at 1105 ("the compensation system is often
inadequate"). Cf. Schwartz, supra note 100, at 991-1000 (pressures inherent in the military system
cause relief programs to break down when they are most needed).
102. See Note, FTCA Recovery, supra note 18, at 1108 ("there is no substitute for congres-
sionally mandated tort recovery").
103. E.g., Brown v. United States, 739 F.2d 362 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 904
(1985). The Eighth Circuit admitted that the case presented a unique factual situation, not directly
controlled by any of its previous decisions. Id. at 367. However, the court applied parts of the
Feres, Bivens and Chappell decisions as a way to reach its holding that recovery should be allowed
for injuries suffered when an enlistee was subject to a mock lynching by other members of the
military. Id. at 362.
104. Cf. Note, Intramilitary Immunity, supra note 55, at 350 (greater recognition for consti-
tutional rights will serve to promote respect for authority within military and will serve to ease
recruitment problems).
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Rights in many other contexts, such as the fourth amendment's protection
against unreasonable search and seizure, 05 the fourteenth amendment's guar-
antee of equal protection, 0 6 and the first amendment's guarantee of freedom
of speech, '07 they believed that the weight given to constitutional claims brought
by military personnel should be greater than the weight given to common law
tort claims brought by the same group. 06
In response, other commentators opined that granting an extra degree of
protection to constitutional tort claims under Bivens, but barring FTCA claims
under Feres created problems. They suggested that a little "creative complaint
writing" could eventually lead to all claims being framed as constitutional
actions for which recovery would be allowed. "' For example, common law
false imprisonment claims could be restructured as eighth amendment cruel
and unusual punishment claims. To prevent this restructuring, they contended
that all claims should be treated equally under a uniform standard." 0 The
Court accepted this logic, as evidenced by its use of a Feres-Bivens combination
in the Chappell decision. "' The Court continues to use a similar analysis in
most claims arising from military service.
F. The Prohibitions On Human Experimentation
Because the Army experiments involved the use of humans as experimental
guinea pigs, these experiments should have been subjected to the constraints
of the principles developed at Nuremberg and elsewhere. The historical de-
velopment of these principles reflected a recognition of the need for human
subjects in scientific research." 2 However, the potential for gross abuse was
also recognized. That potential for abuse was graphically illustrated at the
1947 Nuremberg medical trials, where the heinous deeds of German doctors,
allegedly committed to promote the development of science, were brought to
center stage." 3 The medical trials resulted in the promulgation of stringent
105. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (protection against illegal searches and
seizures).
106. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (separate but equal struck down).
107. See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (first amendment freedom of
speech recognized).
108. Note, Intramilitary Immunity, supra note 55, at 350. See generally United States v. Carolene
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (intervention on behalf of non-economic fundamental
rights recognized as important goal).
109. Jaffe v. United States, 663 F.2d 1226, 1235 (3rd Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 972
(1982) (virtually every case could now be brought successfully through carefully drafted pleadings).
Cf. Brown, 739 F.2d at 367 (there is no difference between a Bivens constitutional cause of action
and a cause of action brought under statutory provisions).
110. Jaffe, 663 F.2d at 1235.
111. 462 U.S. 296, 298-99 (1982) ("special factors" in Bivens provided basis for Feres).
112. Fortner v. Koch, 261 N.W. 762 (1935).
113. United States v. Brandt (The Medical Case), 2 Trials of War Criminals Before the
Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10 (1949).
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standards to govern human experimentation and research procedures." 4 Sig-
nificantly, those standards ("The Nuremberg Code") were established by the
United States military, as overseer of the Nuremberg trials."' Although the
Nuremberg Code did not carry the weight of an American statute," 6 most
commentators viewed it as the primary control mechanism over human ex-
perimentation.'"7
The Nuremberg Code's first principle stressed that voluntary informed
consent by the human subject is absolutely essential." ' But determining the
scope of "informed consent" created problems in practical application. Vol-
unteers did not necessarily have the sophistication or the academic training to
evaluate the procedures fully, or to become completely informed."19 Addition-
ally, volunteers did not necessarily have the status to consent unequivocally
because a large percentage of "voluntary" research was done on captive
volunteers, such as prisoners or mental hospital patients.'12
Most research groups, recognizing these difficulties, tried to provide addi-
tional safeguards as a means to minimize the potential for abuse. Some of
these safeguards included the use of prior review and clearance, the use of a
monitor throughout the project concerned solely with the subject's welfare,
or the use of professional sanctions or civil liability for researchers who strayed
outside accepted boundaries.'2 ' The considerations underlying the rules and
guidelines recognized that although research on human subjects was necessary,
the sanctity of the subject's life was of primary importance. Strict standards
were created to ensure that these interests were properly guarded in all
situations.
II. UN=iD STATES V. STANLEY
A. Facts And Procedure
In February, 1958, James B. Stanley, a Master Sergeant in the United States
Army, volunteered for an Army chemical warfare testing program ostensibly
114. See generally Ladimer, Ethical and Legal Aspects of Medical Research on Human Beings,
3 J. PuB. L. 467 (1954).
115. See Mulford, Experimentation on Human Beings, 20 STAN. L. REv. 99, 102 (1967) (tribunal
was composed of American judges and used American procedural rules).
116. Id. at 102-03.
117. See generally Ladimer, supra note 114, at 467-68; Bassiouni, Baffes and Evrard, An
Appraisal of Human Experimentation in International Law and Practice: The Need for Interna-
tional Regulation of Human Experimentation, 72 J. Cane. L. & CRDnOLocv 1597, 1601-02 (1981)
[hereinafter Bassiouni, Human Experimentation). Further, the Nuremberg principles have been
used as the basis for a number of other regulations, such as Air Force Regulation No. 169-8 (Use
of Volunteers in Aerospace Research); The International Code of Medical Ethics promulgated by
the General Association of the World Medical Association; and the Declaration of Helsinki, Art.
11, § I. Id. at 1609-21.
118. Bassiouni, Human Experimentation, supra note 117, at 1611 (emphasis added).
119. Mulford, supra note 115, at 106.
120. Id. See Ladimer, supra note 114, at 493. One state, New York, has addressed the issue
and has specifically prohibited experiments on mental patients, stating that the only purposes for
psychiatric hospitalization are care and treatment. Id.
121. Id.
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intended to test and to develop the effectiveness of protective clothing and
equipment.1 22 During the course of the program, Stanley was secretly given
lysergic acid diethylamide ("LSD").'1 Stanley contended that as a direct result
of his exposure to LSD he suffered severe physical and mental injuries'1 which
impaired his military service and culminated in the dissolution of his marriage
in 1970. 12
In 1975, the Army sent Stanley a letter soliciting his participation in a
follow-up study, aimed at examining the long term effects of LSD on the
1958 program volunteers.'2 This letter was the first time Stanley learned of
his LSD exposure and the true nature of the 1958 program.'2 Rather than
participate in the follow-up study, Stanley filed an administrative claim with
the army which was denied.128 Subsequently, Stanley filed suit in the district
court for the Southern District of Florida, which granted the government's
motion for summary judgment. 29 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the
122. United States v. Stanley, 107 S. Ct. 3054, 3055 (1987). The Court of Appeals' opinion
stated that the statutory basis for the program Stanley participated in was "the Organization of
the Army Act of 1950 (64 Stat. 322, 5 U.S.C. § 235a)," which authorized the Secretary of the
Army to conduct research and development programs related to Army activities. Stanley v. Central
Intelligence Agency, 639 F.2d 1147, 1148-49 n.2 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981). The genesis of the research
program at issue in this case was a February 26, 1953 memo from the Secretary of Defense to
the service secretaries concerning the use of human volunteers in research programs. Id. The
Secretary of the Army acted on this memo on November 3, 1955 when he gave the Army's
Director of Research and Development complete authority over research matters. Id. On May 17,
1956, the Director approved a psycho-chemical research program in which volunteers were to be
used in chemical warfare defense tests. hd. One of the substances approved for testing was LSD.
Id.
123. Id. at 3057. It is an accepted fact that Stanley received LSD four times over a one month
period. Id.
124. Id. Stanley alleges hallucinations, periods of incoherence and memory loss, impaired
military performance resulting in a reduction in rank, and periods of violent behavior during
which he would beat his wife and children but then be unable to remember the incidents. Id.
125. Id. These allegations, presented in Stanley's second amended complaint, were accepted as
true for the purpose of this decision. Id. at 3057. Therefore, the fact that Stanley remained in
the Army for an additional 11 years, and then was honorably discharged in 1969, has no bearing
on the sufficiency of his complaint. See id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. The United States Army Claims Division had concluded that Stanley's FTCA claims
were not payable because "injuries to individuals incurred while on duty with the United States
Army are considered to be incident to the individual's service." Stanley v. Central Intelligence
Agency, 639 F.2d 1146, 1149 n.5 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981). The Army had not closed all doors to
Stanley, though, since it had suggested that he could file suit in district court if he was dissatisfied
with the disposition of the case. Id.
Stanley also had filed a claim against the Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA"), which was
dismissed when both the CIA and the Judge Advocate General's offices found nothing in their
records to establish CIA involvement. Id. at 1149 n.4.
129. No. 78-8141-Cir.-CF (S.D. Fla. May 14, 1979). Since Stanley was "at all times on active
duty and participating in a bona fide Army program," the district court concluded that his claim
was barred by the Feres doctrine which preempts FTCA recovery when the injuries are "in the
course of activity incident to service." 107 S. Ct. at 3057.
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dismissal of the FTCA claim, but also remanded, concluding that Stanley
"has at least a colorable constitutional claim based on Bivens."'
In response, Stanley amended his complaint by adding a Bivens claim against
unknown individual officers, and a claim for a separate tort occurring sub-
sequent to his discharge. 3' Once again, the Southern District of Florida
dismissed the tort claim."' However, it refused to dismiss Stanley's Bivens
claim, and voluntarily certified an order for an interlocutory appeal under 28
U.S.C. section 1292 (b). 33
Upon the government's request for, and the district court's grant of,
summary judgment,'3 ' Stanley again amended his complaint, naming nine
individuals as defendants.' In response, the district court recertified its order
for an interlocutory appeal, which the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
130. 639 F.2d 1146 (1981). The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's conclusion that
Stanley's Feres claim should be denied, but not by means of summary judgment. Id. at 1148.
Instead, the Fifth Circuit believed that the proper disposition was dismissal for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, since a suit defeated under the FTCA should be defeated at its inception
without the merits being reached. Id. at 1148 & 1157. The court also stated that although it did
not have a position on the merits, Stanley might have presented a constitutional Bivens claim. Id.
at 1159.
131. Stanley v. United States, 549 F. Supp. 327 (S.D. Fla. 1982). These amendments were
necessary for two reasons. First, an action under Bivens is directed at individual federal officers,
so Stanley's original claim against the government did not present the proper adverse party. Id.
at 330 (citing Jaffe v. United States, 592 F.2d 712 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961 (1979))
(Jaffe sued government itself so his reliance on Bivens and Butz, which were suits against individual
federal officers, was incorrect). Second, although the Feres doctrine bars FTCA recovery for
claims incident to service, claims for separate torts occurring subsequent to discharge are not
barred. Id. at 329 (citing Schurman v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 429 (E.D. Va. 1980)) [no
causal connection between injury and post-discharge negligence so no recovery given); Thornwell
v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 344 (D.D.C. 1979) [claims for post-discharge conduct not barred
by Feres doctrine]).
132. 549 F. Supp. 327 (S.D. Fla. 1982). The district court concluded that Stanley's FTCA claim
was still barred by the Feres doctrine since the amended complaint failed to persuade the court
that there were separate and distinct acts occurring after discharge. Id. at 329.
133. Id. at 332. The district court cited the Ninth Circuit's decision in Wallace v. Chappell,
661 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1981), as its authority for not barring the Bivens action. Id. at 331. In
Wallace. the Ninth Circuit held that even if a FTCA claim is barred by the Feres principles, a
Bivens claim based on the same set of facts is not necessarily barred. Id. Accord Davis v. Passman,
442 U.S. 228 (1979). The Supreme Court's reversal of the Fifth Circuit in Davis, which had denied
recovery, was an important decision for Stanley's Bivens claim. 549 F. Supp. at 331. Up until
this reversal the future of the Bivens cause of action was questionable. See id. Davis unequivocally
recognized the Bivens constitutional cause of action. Id.
134. Stanley v. Central Intelligence Agency, 552 F. Supp. 619 (S.D. Fla. 1982). The government's
summary judgment motion was based on its contention that it and three federal agencies had
been improperly named as FTCA defendants. 107 S. Ct. at 3058. Also, since no individual
defendants had been named, the government believed that there was no one to seek interlocutory
review of the court's refusal to dismiss the Bivens action. Id.
135. 107 S. Ct. at 3058 n.2. The named defendants included two employees of the University
of Maryland-Gerald Klee, M.D. and Walter Weintraub, M.D.-and seven federal agents or
employees-Joseph R. Bertino, M.D., H.D. Collier, Albert Dreisbach, Bernard G. Elfert, Sidney
Gottlieb, M.D., Richard Helms, and Van Sim, M.D. Id.
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Circuit granted. On appeal, the court affirmed that Stanley's Bivens claim
was not barred.' In addition, the Eleventh Circuit stepped outside the bounds
of the order appealed from and remanded the case so the district court could
reevaluate whether Stanley had a viable FTCA claim.'37 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to address the reinstatement of the FTCA claim and to
attempt to resolve the intercircuit conflicts in the Bivens and Feres areas.1 39
B. The Opinions In Stanley
1. Justice Scalia's mqjority opinion
Justice Scalia's majority opinion 39 addressed Stanley's FTCA and Bivens
claims separately. The opinion quickly vacated the reinstated FTCA claim on
jurisdictional grounds. Because interlocutory appeal is restricted to the partic-
ular order appealed from, I40 the Supreme Court believed that the Eleventh
136. Stanley v. United States, 786 F.2d 1490 (1lth Cir. 1986). The Eleventh Circuit had to
address what, if any, effect the Supreme Court's reversal of the Ninth Circuit in Chappell v.
Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983), during the course of the Stanley proceedings, had on this case. Id.
at 1493. See supra note 133. The Stanley district court opinion had held that Chappell did not
affect the Bivens disposition here. Id. (citing 574 F. Supp. 474 (S.D. Fla. 1983), mod. 587 F.
Supp. 1071 (S.D. Fla. 1984)). The Eleventh Circuit affirmed that holding and concluded that
Stanley's Bivens action was not precluded by Chappell because neither of the special factors
deemed dispositive in Chappell-the unique disciplinary structure of the military establishment
and Congress's plenary authority and extensive activity in the military field-were present here.
Id. at 1496. Nor was Stanley's Bivens action precluded under the adequate alternative remedies
exception, since the court did not view the VBA's limited liability provisions as a sufficient
alternative. Id. at 1497.
137. Although the Eleventh Circuit admitted that Stanley 1, 639 F.2d 1146, 1150 (5th Cir. Unit
B 1981), had established the "law of the case" on Stanley's pre-discharge FTCA claim against
the government, the court found an exception to the law of the case doctrine. Id. at 1497. This
doctrine dictates that an appellate court's findings of fact and conclusions of law generally are
binding in all subsequent proceedings in the same case. Id. at 1497 (citing Dorsey v. Continental
Casualty Co., 730 F.2d 675, 678 (1 1th Cir. 1984)). But this doctrine is only a general rule. There
are three recognized exceptions in which the federal courts have power to reopen issues previously
decided: 1) where substantially different evidence is presented on subsequent trial; 2) where a
contrary decision of law applicable to the issues is made by a controlling authority; and, 3) where
a previous decision is clearly erroneous and manifestly unjust. Id. at 1498 (citing Westbrook v.
Zant, 743 F.2d 764, 768-69 (11th Cir. 1984) (citing White v. Murtha, 377 F.2d 428, 432 (5th Cir.
1967))). The Eleventh Circuit believed that the second exception applied to Stanley because of the
decisions rendered in United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52 (1985); Cole v. United States, 755
F.2d 873. reh. denied, 765 F.2d 1123 (11th Cir. 1985); and, Johnson v. United States, 749 F.2d
1530 (11 th Cir. 1984), during the course of the Stanley proceedings. Id. These three cases mandated
that the courts conduct a case-by-case analysis to evaluate whether precluding a FTCA claim
brought by someone in the military would serve the purpose of the Feres doctrine. Id. at 1499.
138. 107 S. Ct. at 3059.
139. Rehnquist, C.J., joined by White, Blackmun & Powell, JJ. Id. at 3057. Brennan, Marshall,
Stevens & O'Connor, JJ., joined in Part I only. Id.
140. Id. at 3060. The Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1292(b). Id. 28 U.S.C. section 1292(b) governs interlocutory appeals,
which are appeals based on decisions other than final decisions, and restricts these appeals to an
order made by a district judge. Id.
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Circuit had overstepped the restrictions on it by addressing something outside
the scope of that order.
The Eleventh Circuit's conclusion that Stanley could proceed with his Bivens
claim notwithstanding the Chappell decision also did not fare well in the
Supreme Court. Stanley claimed that because his injury was not incident to
service, 14' and, because the- situation invoked no chain of command concerns,
which were of primary importance in Chappell,'4 2 Chappell should not be
strictly controlling. The Court refused to accept Stanley's argument because
it believed the incident to service issue had already been decided against him.'43
Also, the Court refused to accept Stanley's construction of Chappell, con-
cluding instead that since Feres had guided the Court's analysis of the Bivens
claim in Chappell, the Feres level of protection for the military should be
extended to all Bivens claims, including the claim currently before the Court.'"
In so doing, Scalia's opinion noted that the special factors found in the unique
disciplinary structure of the military, and Congress' activity in relation to the
military, both required that the incident to service rule articulated in Feres
apply to both FTCA and constitutional claims. 45 Consequently, Stanley's
recovery was denied on both counts.
2. Justice O'Connor's concurrence in part, dissent in part
Justice O'Connor concurred with the majority that Stanley's cause of action
under the FTCA should not be reinstated.'" O'Connor also concurred with
the majority's holding that as a general rule there is no Bivens remedy for
injuries arising "incident to service."'' 4 7 However, her analysis of Stanley's
claim led her to dissent from the majority's denial of Stanley's Bivens claim.
O'Connor concluded that the military's conduct here was so heinous and so
far beyond the bounds of human decency that it could never be considered
within the bounds of military activity.'" Hence, O'Connor did not view this
as a military liability case, but instead saw it as a case of involuntary human
141. Id. at 3061.
142. Id. See supra notes 88-94 and accompanying text. See also Zjllman, Tort Liability of Military
Officers: Initial Examination of Chappell, 27-50-128 Aua, LAw. 29, 31 (1983) (special emphasis
of decision was on superior-subordinate relationship); Schwartz, supra note 100, at 996 (rights of
soldiers must be tempered to meet "overriding demands of discipline and duty .....
143. 107 S. Ct. at 3066.
144. Id. at 3061-63.
145. Id. at 3063. See Zillman, supra note 142, at 36 (if concern is with disrupting the military
by filing lawsuit, why differentiate between two types of claims?). But see Chappell, 462 U.S. at
299 ("the Court's analysis in Feres guides our analysis in this case"); Donaldson, supra note 40,
at 191 (Chappell undermined Feres because it concluded that, if a constitutional cause of action
is established, then qualified immunity applies).
146. 107 S. Ct. at 3065.
147. Id. at 3065. Her conclusion stemmed from the belief that Chappell and Feres must be
read together as preventing suits in civilian courts to determine military liability. Id.
148. Id.
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experimentation, condemned by the Nuremberg trials ard by constitutional
due process guarantees. 14 9 O'Connor would have allowed Stanley's Bivens
action to proceed.
3. Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion
Justice Brennan's dissent'" also joined part I of the majority opinion, and
concluded that Stanley's FTCA claim should not have been reinstated by the
Eleventh Circuit. But Brennan's agreement with the majority opinion stopped
there, as his dissent proceeded to castigate the majority'for "disregard[ing]
the commands of our Constitution" ' by denying Stanley a Bivens remedy.
Brennan concluded that the Army's use and abuse of Stanley, treating him
as if he were a laboratory animal and surreptitiously dosing him with dangerous
drugs, violated all standards of what is legally and morally acceptable." 2
Brennan concluded that such blatant overreaching by the military demonstrated
that the military decision making process must not be left unsupervised.'"
Instead, he opined that soldiers must be afforded the opportunity to find
relief in a Bivens action just as their civilian counterparts are afforded this
opportunity. '1
Brennan predicted that the inevitable result of this decision would be absolute
immunity from liability for money damages for all federal officials-military
and civilian alike.'" Brennan believed that such a result would be impermissible
in light of longstanding caselaw which had established that officials are liable
for damages caused by their intentional violations of constitutional rights.,"
149. Id. at 3065-66.
150. Marshall, J. joined in the dissent. Stevens, J. joined in part III. Id. at 3066.
151. Id. at 3066. Brennan concluded that the Constitution demands that everyone be provided
either injunctive relief or damages when a constitutional tort is suffered.
152. Id. at 3066-67. See supra notes 112-21 and accompanying text.
153. Id. at 3067. Interestingly, Brennan believed that the Army recognized the "moral and
legal implications" of the testing program but went ahead with the program anyway. Id. His
evidence for this belief was a 1959 Army Intelligence Corps Staff Study, which discussed the need
to keep the LSD program secret. Id. See also S. REP. No. 755, Book I, p. 392 (1976) (keep
knowledge away from public of these "unethical and illicit activities"). Id. In light of this gross
abuse by the military, Brennan concluded that government officials should not be granted absolute
immunity. Id. As an example of what can happen when the military is left unchecked, Brennan
cited cases such as Jaffe, 663 F.2d 1226 (3rd Cir. 1981); where enlistees were forced to stand
unprotected while an atomic bomb was dropped nearby; and Barrett v. United States, No. 76
Civ. 381 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), where an unconsenting mental hospital patient was used in Army
mescaline tests.
154. Id. at 3068. ("An injunction, however, comes too late for those already injured; for these
victims, it is damages or nothing.") (quoting Bivens, 403 U.S. at 410 (Harlan, J. concurring)).
155. Id.
156. See id. at 3068-69 (citing Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979)). The Davis Court had
concluded that "legislators ought... generally to be bound by [the law] as are ordinary persons."
Davis, 442 U.S. at 246 (quoting Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 615 (1972)). The need to
vindicate citizens' rights was also recognized in Butz, 438 U.S. at 504-05. Butz clearly established
that constitutional limits must be maintained. Id. at 506-07.
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Absent immunity, legislators, members of the military, and ordinary persons
should be liable for damages.
According to the dissent, the correct analysis here would entail reviewing
the Bivens special factors doctrine along with the immunity doctrine since
both doctrines are based on identical concerns."" After recognizing that the
immunity doctrine should apply to this case, Brennan recommended remanding
the case to consider whether there were exceptional circumstances present
which justified a grant of absolute immunity."' Absent such circumstances,
the generally accepted principles of qualified immunity should apply. Second,
Brennan recommended restricting the Chappell exception to Bivens recovery
to a narrow reading.'"9 This revised Chappell-Bivens doctrine should then be
utilized to provide a basis for the constitutional claims. Rather than using a
broad inflexible ruling barring recovery, Brennan opined that recovery under
Bivens would result in an analysis which would accommodate both the interest
in maintaining military discipline and the need for protecting essential human
dignity, two competing concerns that Brennan believed the courts should not
ignore. 60
III. ANALYSIS
A. Strengths And Weaknesses Of The Stanley Decision-A Short
Summary
The Supreme Court's decision in Stanley, vacating the Eleventh Circuit's
ruling that Stanley could reinstate his FTCA claim and reversing the Eleventh
Circuit's ruling that Stanley could proceed with his Bivens claim notwithstand-
ing Chappell, left Stanley with virtually no recourse for the wrongs inflicted
upon him. His administrative remedies had been exhausted,' 6' and now his
judicial remedies were exhausted as well. The Supreme Court reached its
decision to refuse to grant Stanley relief by analyzing the Feres, Bivens and
Chappell doctrines. 62 But as this Casenote will show, the Court's conclusion
157. Id. at 3069-70. By reviewing both at the same time, Brennan explicitly recognized that
damages remedies are mere hollow shells if all federal officials are given immunity. See id. at
3070. See also Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 538-39 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring) (both
are based on identical concerns and as such do not produce different outcomes).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 3073. Brennan stressed that Chappell's main concern was with the officer-subordinate
relationship, a concern not present here. Id. See also Zillman, supra note 136, at 33 (Chappell
does not end the possibility of military commanders being sued because, although the dicta was
broad, opinion itself was narrow).
160. Id. at 3077. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text. But see Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S.
733 (1974) and Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 (1953), which both concluded that immediate,
reflexive responses are vital for the proper functioning of the military.
161. See supra note 128.
162. See supra notes 8-10, 139-45 and accompanying texts.
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on how these doctrines apply to Stanley's situation, and other similar ones,
is inconsistent with history and precedent.
The Stanley Court attempted to set forth guidelines for suits arising from
tortious behavior by a superior toward a subordinate enlistee. The Court stated
that it would clarify the Chappell decision for the appellate courts which, to
the date of this decision, were applying Chappell inconsistently.'6 Theoreti-
cally, solving this conflict between the circuits would serve an important
function because it would establish a consistent standard for the lower courts
to follow.'6
However, rather than analyze the Feres doctrine fully, the Supreme Court
simply vacated the FTCA claim on procedural grounds. Such a quick dismissal
did not provide the guidelines needed by the lower courts. Instead the lower
courts will remain at odds on their definitions of "incident to service" and
on the application of these definitions to the military context.
The Court's analysis of the Bivens constitutional cause of action muddled
the issues by attempting to create blanket immunity for the military without
fully analyzing the particular fact situation. The Court seemed eager to preclude
Bivens remedies at any cost. 61 As a result, the Court read the Chappell case
expansively, a case which was not entirely applicable to Stanley.'6 The majority
also ignored the well-settled immunity principles, which generally grant qual-
ified immunity, except in those limited situations where special circumstances
create the need for absolute immunity. The Court equated Feres FTCA
recovery with Bivens constitutional recovery under their broad interpretation
of Chappell.
In sum, the Court seized Chappell, a decision which created a limited
exception to Bivens recovery, stretched it beyond recognition, and justified its
actions by phrases such as "incident to military service" and "the unique
disciplinary structure of the military.' '6 7 If the Court had focused on phrases
such as "morally unacceptable acts" and "government officials remaining free
to violate constitutional rights," its decision would have focused on the real
issues of the case. But as the case stands, the glaring weaknesses are ripe for
criticism.
163. 107 S. Ct. at 3059. Cases such as Jordan v. National Guard Bureau, 799 F.2d 99 (3rd
Cir. 1986); Trerice v. Summons, 755 F.2d 1081 (4th Cir. 1985); Mollnow v. Carlton, 716 F.2d
627 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100 (1984), and Gaspard v. United States, 713 F.2d
1097 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 975 (1984), failed to uniformly interpret the Chappell
doctrine. Id. at 3059 n.3.
164. Id. The Court sought to create such a precedent here.
165. See 107 S. Ct. at 3066 (Brennan, J. dissenting). But see Kelly, The Right of Federal
Employees to Sue Their Supervisors for Injuries Consequent Upon Constitutional Violations, 108
Mn. L. Ray. 211, 273 (1985) (suits against superiors for injuries from constitutional violations
should not be foreclosed).
166. Id. at 3073 (Brennan, J. dissenting). The Court admitted that some of Chappell's language
would not be applicable to the case at bar, but then proceeded to rely on Chappell for its special
factors analysis. Id. at 3061.
167. Id. at 3059.
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B. Governmental Immunity And The FTCA In Stanley
The Supreme Court vacated Stanley's statutory FTCA claim on strictly
procedural grounds. 16s Admittedly, the Court's reasoning would be upheld
under Title 28 alone. Jurisdiction, pursuant to Title 28, section 1292(b), is
limited to the particular order from which the party appeals. 69 Limited judicial
review is consistent with established principles concerned with fairness in the
judicial process.'10 By concluding that some decisions are final and not subject
to review, stability is imparted into the system. This interest in stability is also
evident in the "law of the case" doctrine, which establishes that conclusions
of law, determined by an appellate court, are not subject to review by
subsequent trial and appellate courts. '1 Hence, the provisions in section 1292(b)
and the "law of the case" doctrine focus on the same purposes of fairness
and stability.
Nevertheless, the "law of the case doctrine" is more flexible than the
principles set forth in section 1292(b). This flexibility is provided by three
exceptions which allow federal courts to reopen issues that have been previously
decided on appeal.' 72 The Eleventh Circuit believed that the second exception,
"where controlling authority has made a contrary decision of law," was
applicable to Stanley's claim in light of its recent decision in Johnson v.
United States.'7 Johnson demands a case-by-case analysis when the facts
presented are sufficiently different from those presented in Feres.'7 4 Only by
conducting such a particularized analysis did the Eleventh Circuit believe that
the courts could properly determine whether or not the purposes behind the
Feres doctrine would be furthered by precluding FTCA recovery in individual
cases.'7 Had the Supreme Court managed to find some validity in the Eleventh
168. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
169. Id. Since the case came to the Court under section 1292(b), it was not a section 1291 final
decision. Id. The Court believed that it should only look to the order appealed from to determine
the scope of the issues open for discussion. Id. (citing 16 C. Wuosn, A. MIT MR, E. COOPER &
E. Gxssi&w, FEm.A PRAcTcE AND PROCEDtR, § 3929, p 143 (1977)). In addition, the Court
felt that it was doubly improper to rule on the FTCA claim since the United States government
had been dismissed as a party to the Bivens claim sometime earlier. Id.
170. See Pritchard-Keang Nam Corp. v. Jaworski, 751 F.2d 277 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. dism'd.,
472 U.S. 1022 (1985); United States v. Bear Marine Serv., 696 F.2d 1117 (5th Cir. 1983).
171. 786 F.2d at 1497-98.
172. Id. at 1498. The three exceptions in which federal courts have the power to reopen issues
are: 1) where substantially different evidence appears at a later trial; 2) where a contrary decision
of law has been made by a controlling authority; or, 3) where a previous decision is clearly
erroneous.
173. 749 F.2d 1530 (11th Cir. 1985).
174. Id. at 1537. In Johnson, a Coast Guard helicopter pilot's widow brought a wrongful death
action under the FTCA. The district court had dismissed the claim based on the Feres principles.
Id. at 1532. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed because it believed that
granting relief would not encroach upon the principles behind the Feres doctrine. Id. at 1531.
Where the facts don't match those presented in Feres, an individualized evaluation should be
done. Id. at 1538. Contra supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
175. Id. The stated purpose, to provide a remedy where none had been provided before, must
be examined before recovery is granted or denied. See Johnson, 749 F.2d at 1537.
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Circuit's "law of the case" analysis, it might have been able to decide the
proper role for the Feres doctrine in intramilitary tort suits.
The Feres doctrine, although the subject of critical commentary, 76 is "be-
yond question ... the law." 1" The straightforward application of that doctrine
in cases where the facts closely mirror the facts in Feres-i.e., an FTCA suit
for injuries or death allegedly caused by a serviceman's or an armed forces
employee's negligence-does not create problems. The dispositive issue to be
decided in such cases is whether or not the plaintiff is precluded by the
"incident to service" exception to recovery announced in Feres. 7 If the facts
do not fit neatly under the Feres doctrine, such as in Chappell, Johnson, and
the case at bar, the courts should then engage in a case-by-case analysis,
evaluating the underlying Feres rationales to determine whether or not denying
recovery comports with the policies which underlie the FTCA."9 The Stanley
opinion could have provided substantial guidance to the lower courts on how
to apply the Feres doctrine in those and other instances.
Originally, the Feres doctrine was justified by four considerations, however,
today there are three.' These justifications are: 1) the distinctly federal nature
of the soldier-sovereign relationship; 2) the existence of a no-fault statutory
compensation scheme as a substitute for governmental tort liability; and, 3)
the adverse effect of these claims on the military disciplinary structure.'
Where these justifications would not be undermined, the plaintiff's FTCA
claim should not be barred' by the Feres doctrine. '
Assuming that the Eleventh Circuit's "law of the case" exception was
correct and the reinstated FTCA claim should have been evaluated, the next
step for the Stanley court would have been to examine whether the above
three justifications would have been undermined by allowing recovery. In
short, they would not have been. First, the FTCA claim presented by Stanley
was distinctly federal. Stanley did not ask for relief under state procedures,
176. See generally Hale v. United States, 416 F.2d 355 (6th Cir. 1969) (court openly criticized
Feres doctrine as too vague); Schwager v. United States, 279 F. Supp. 262 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (further
analysis of facts in each separate case is necessary to decide whether or not Feres recovery should
be precluded). See also note 34 and accompanying text.
177. Brown, 739 F.2d at 365 (quoting Laswell v. Brown, 683 F.2d 261, 265 (8th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1210 (1983)).
178. E.g., Parker v. United States, 611 F.2d 1007 (5th Cir. 1980) (issue presented is then limited
to whether injury arose out of or during course of activity "incident to service").
179. See also Hunt v. United States, 636 F.2d 580 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (court did not automatically
extend Feres doctrine to factual situation not similar to that presented in Feres).
180. The fourth rationale, the parallel personal liability provision, is no longer utilized. See
Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 671-72 (1977) (Court only elaborated
on three underlying rationales); Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 319 (1957)
(private liability defense is misinterpretation of purposes behind FTCA); Indian Towing Co. v.
United States, 350 U.S. 61, 64-65 (1955) (no parallel private liability is necessary for FTCA
claim to stand). See also Note, FTCA Recovery, supra note 18, at 1103 (courts first undermined,
then abolished, parallel private liability requirement).
181. Johnson, 749 F.2d at 1532-34.
182. Id. at 1531 & 1540.
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which would upset the balance of the soldier-sovereign relationship. Instead,
by instituting a claim under the FTCA, Stanley proceeded under a federal
recovery system. Second, an adequate substitute compensation scheme set up
as an alternative for FTCA recovery did not exist. VBA recovery is limited
recovery.'83 Any recovery that might have been awarded under the VBA could
not have begun to compensate Stanley for the injuries he suffered at the hands
of the military. Third, the FTCA claim would have neither disrupted the
military nor exerted an adverse influence on military discipline. There is a
significant difference between military discipline concerns on the battlefield
and discipline concerns during peacetime. Combat situations call for strict
discipline as a means to assure that responses will be immediate and unwav-
ering. But here Stanley was a voluntary participant in an Army research
program, presenting no threat to discipline. As a result, had the Supreme
Court reached the issue, the government's contention that the FTCA claim
should have been barred because of the Feres doctrine would not have stood
up to a full analysis of the justifications behind Feres.
The Court's hesitance to address the interests which impact on the Feres
doctrine parallels the civilian courts' reluctance to enter the military forum.
Military and civilian systems are viewed as two unique entities, each concerned
with its own mission and purpose.' u As a result, civilian courts are somewhat
ignorant about the internal structure of the military system. For example, the
Feres Court relied heavily on the term "incident to service" but failed to
define it, leaving lower courts free to apply differing interpretations.' If the
Supreme Court had established a definition for "incident to service" in this
case, it would have negated the problems that result from the inconsistent
definitions and applications of the term. Instead, without such a definition,
the Feres principle has been, and will continue to be, applied haphazardly by
lower courts and the Supreme Court.
Had the Supreme Court defined "incident to service," its application in
this case might have resulted in a different conclusion concerning Stanley's
FTCA claim. Such a conclusion would have turned on whether the Court
found that the purposes behind the Feres doctrine were met. But more
importantly, the time for framing a concrete definition for "incident to
service" had arrived. The Supreme Court should have seized the opportunity
183. See Howland, supra note 79, at 136. Veteran's benefits under the VBA can not justify
foreclosing intramilitary tort suits because, rather than being a definite remedy, they are not a
matter of right. Id. They are contingent on getting the appropriate discharge, and are much
smaller than tort remedies. Id. The benefits do not provide damages for pain, suffering, or loss
of consortium, and are not punitive. Id. at 137. See also Note FTCA Recovery, supra note 18,
at 1107 (veteran benefits are merely a conditional gift, not an adequate replacement for tort
remedies). But see Miller, supra note 40, at 10 (Stencel court showed that VBA recovery could
be adequate and at the same time preserve military discipline).
184. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text. See Sherman, supra note 5, at 540-41 (1974)
(nature of military community makes separation between military and civilian communities nec-
essary).
185. See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
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to address this issue, thus clearing the path for civilian involvement in the
military realm, an area where civilian courts fear to tread.
The Court's reluctance to get involved in military matters is out of step
with the modem day relationship between the military and the civilian sectors.
With the advent of the all volunteer armed services, the same disciplinary
concerns are no longer implicated.' Instead, the modem military is viewed
as a career option for some people. The term "servicemen" no longer means
combat-ready males; instead, both sexes are represented and non-combat
employees far outnumber combat employees.'1 The belief that servicemen
should be expected to give up their rights upon entering the service is no
longer valid.'s Instead servicemen, just like their civilian counterparts, should
be given ready relief against the government for tort violations. If the Court
had found some way to accept the reinstated FTCA claim, it could have
analyzed whether such relief was warranted in this instance.
C. Individual Immunity and the Bivens Claim in Stanley-The Majority
Opinion
The Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit's holding which had
allowed Stanley to proceed with his Bivens claim because it believed that the
Court of Appeals had taken too narrow a view of the circumstances in which
courts could deny damages recovery for injuries incurred during military
service. 9 Essentially, the Court's decision was based on its reading of the
"special factors counselling hesitation" exception and the "explicit congres-
sional declaration" exception set forth in the Bivens dicta. 9°
The Bivens decision was a significant departure from the absolute immunity
which was being extended to a diverse group of federal officials under the
guise of protecting both federal authority and the unimpeded practice of
official discretion. 91 However, this absolute immunity concept had been abused
through overextension and used to protect officials even where malicious
conduct, intentional wrongfulness, or negligent action was at issue. Provided
the situation could be viewed as within the outer perimeters of the person's
official authority immunity was granted.' 92 Bivens established that a cause of
186. See Howland, supra note 79, at 107, 115 (author recognizes that there has been a dramatic
increase in the number of permanent military personnel and in the number of technical non-
combatant roles); Sherman, supra note 5, at 542 (there has been convergence of military and
civilian life).
187. See Howland, supra note 79, at 107-09 (boundaries between military and civilian sectors
has been blurred, and military is now civilian-like bureaucracy).
188. Id. at 114 (reflex obedience to orders is no longer considered to be ideal behavior). See
generally Goodrich, supra note 75, at 50.
189. 107 S. Ct. at 3060.
190. Id. at 3063.
191. See supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text (lower cabinet officials, immigration officers,
SEC employees, and the U.S. marshall are some examples).
192. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
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action for a constitutional violation may give rise to a claim for money
damages, even against governmental officials who until this point had been
enjoying expansive immunity.' 93
The Stanley majority opinion interpreted the Bivens decision as holding that
the question of the availability of a constitutional damages action for particular
injuries is distinct from the question of the availability of immunity for a
particular defendant.' However, the Supreme Court's reliance on Bivens as
a means to circumvent the immunity doctrine ignores its earlier analysis in
Butz v. Economou,' which had reconciled the developing lines of immunity
for state and federal officials. Butz accordingly established both a cause of
action and a right of recovery.'9
A cause of action and a right of recovery should have been granted in
Stanley. First, Stanley's Bivens claim was valid, based on constitutional tort
concerns. The heinous conduct was inflicted upon him by individuals acting
as governmental officials, who were properly named in Stanley's amended
complaint. 97 After legitimately establishing a cause of action against the
government officials, Stanley should have been awarded recovery. Had the
majority applied Butz and Davis correctly, the result would have been different.
Furthermore, had the majority read Chappell narrowly, Stanley's Bivens
claim would not have been dismissed. The majority's reading coincided with
the cases that interpreted Chappell as creating a per se ban on suits against
the military.'I" This interpretation, however, contradicts the very language of
the Chappell opinion which specifically declared that not all redress for military
personnel was to be barred.'" The Chappell decision created a narrow bar to
Bivens recovery, in situations where the military disciplinary structure would
be compromised or where Congress has regulatory control."0 Stanley's Bivens
claim was valid because it did not fall into that narrow area. Because Stanley
was a voluntary participant in the research program, granting relief would not
have posed a threat to the military's disciplinary system. Additionally, no
193. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397.
194. 107 S. C. at 3064.
195. 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
196. See supra notes 68-70. See also Butz, 438 U.S. at 504 (recognizing a Bivens action and
allowing for damages is vital means of redress); Burgess, supra note 15, at 39 (Butz decision
cleared up any lingering confusion about which type of immunity should be given to federal
officials when it held that federal officials are entitled to qualified immunity just like their state
counterparts); and at 57 (if person alleges a constitutional violation compensable in damages,
official has high burden of proof when trying to establish absolute immunity defense).
197. 107 S. Ct. at 3058.
198. See id. at 3068 (Brennan, J. dissenting). But see Benvenuti v. Department of Defense, 587
F. Supp. 348 (D.D.C. 1984); Hampton v. United States, 575 F. Supp. 1180 (W.D. Ark. 1983);
Bishop v. United States, 574 F. Supp. 66 (D.D.C. 1983) (Chappell is absolute bar to recovery).
199. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 304 ("this Court has never held, nor do we now hold, that military
personnel are barred from all redress in civilian courts for constitutional wrongs suffered in the
course of military service").
200. See id. at 304-05.
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battlefield situation existed, no group morale was threatened, and no national
defense interests were compromised. Nor was there any congressional activity
in the field which would have preempted Stanley's claim, since the existence
of the VBA could not have been viewed as an adequate replacement. Since
neither Chappell exception applied, Stanley's Bivens claim should have been
allowed.
D. Individual Immunity and the Bivens Claim in Stanley-the Dissenting
Opinion
Brennan's dissent emphasized the incongruity which would result by using
only the exceptions set forth in the Bivens case as the basis for intramilitary
tort claims. If the courts proceed on the assumption that because the military
establishment has such unique demands for discipline there should always be
a "special factor counselling hesitation," Brennan believes that the practical
effect will be a reinstatement of the absolute immunity doctrine for military
commanders. 2°1 Such absolute immunity disregards the fact that only a narrow
exception to liability was created in Chappell, with all other situations requiring
qualified immunity.
Brennan concluded that the "special factors" analysis and the immunity
analysis are based on parallel concerns and, as such, would not produce
different outcomes.202 Brennan pointed out that qualified immunity for gov-
ernment officials, with limited absolute immunity exceptions, is the norm."
Special factors counselling hesitation are just that-discrete factors. These
factors should be applied sparingly. Brennan equated "special factors" with
absolute immunity only when the situation demands it.20
Meshing the two concepts, as Brennan advised, is consistent with already
accepted principles. The issue of whether sufficient grounds exist to establish
a cause of action would be addressed initially. After answering this question
affirmatively the courts could then decide whether recovery should be allowed.
Absent a showing that absolute immunity is necessary, qualified immunity
would attach and recovery would be allowed or disallowed in light of the
facts of the particular suit. The need for officials to perform their governmental
duties effectively would then be properly balanced against constitutional con-
cerns. Brennan's balancing approach would have resulted in a recognition of
Stanley's constitutional concerns for what they are, grave violations of his
rights for which relief should have been granted.
201. 107 S. Ct. at 3068 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
202. Id. at 3068-69. Both Davis, 442 U.S. 228 (1979), and Butz, 438 U.S. 478 (1978), recognized
that these two concerns were intertwined and as such analyzed them together. Id. at 3069.
203. Id. at 3069.
204. Id. Contra Jordan v. National Guard Bureau, 799 F.2d 99, 107 (1986) (interpreting special
factors to mean qualified immunity in some instances and absolute immunity in others is incorrect
because such an interpretation would require difficult and hair-splitting distinctions).
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E. An Application of the Immunity Principles to the Military and to
Stanley
The Bivens and Butz cases did not address the effect of their holdings on
cases involving the military." Both cases recognized the constitutional tort
claim, but both cases were brought against federal officials, not military
officials.3 The Butz opinion listed which federal officials qualify for the
absolute immunity exception, but said nothing about the military." Those
cases' failure to address the military context left the individual courts faced
with the problem of determining the military's position on the immunity
spectrum.2
The Stanley Court's pronouncement on the immunity question concluded
that the "special factor" of military discipline precluded recovery for service-
men.2 Although this conclusion finds some support '2 0 its foundation can be
easily undermined. The holding is based, in part, on the floodgates of litigation
theory.2 1 Under this theory, to allow a claim such as Stanley's would lead to
a plethora of claims by others similarly situated. Consequently, in order for
the "special factors" doctrine to achieve its desired prophylactic effect,2 2
judicial intrusion into the military must be foreclosed. But floodgates argu-
ments are uncertain at best.2 3 They do not fully evaluate the situation, but
rather base their conclusions on unwarranted generalizations often set forth
in an illogical manner. A particularized inquiry into the specific facts of each
case could control the floodgates while providing those with valid claims the
opportunity to seek redress for the egregious acts committed against them.
The other basis for the Court's expansive conclusion was closely related to
plaintiff's status.214 The Court believed that plaintiff's status as a serviceman
justified a denial of recovery. 2 5 But the Supreme Court has held that statutes
that create liability based on status are unconstitutionally vague and must be
struck down." 's The mere fact that plaintiff is a member of a certain group,
such as the military, should not be enough to establish liability or preclude
205. See supra notes 60-64, 68-70 and accompanying text.
206. Id.
207. See Butz, 438 U.S. at 508-11.
208. Cf Burgess, supra note 15, at 25-26 (1980) (there is nothing to prevent application of
Butz holding to military commanders). But cf. Donaldson, supra note 40, at 173 (Bivens type
lawsuit will fail in military context).
209. 107 S. Ct. at 3063.
210. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397; Butz, 438 U.S. at 500-01.
211. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
212. 107 S. Ct. at 3073-74 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
213. See Burgess, supra note 15, at 42 (author admits that success of this argument is "uncertain
at best").
214. 107 S. Ct. at 3064.
215. Id. at 3064-65.
216. See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) (law prohibiting
vagrancy was unconstitutionally vague); MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.6 (Proposed Official Draft
1962) (redrafted note on loitering to cure vagueness problem).
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recovery. Instead, the courts should utilize a particularized analysis, and
evaluate the conduct and circumstances involved in relation to plaintiff's
position to satisfy the constitutional considerations.21 7
A particularized analysis can be applied successfully in the military context.
A number of courts already have held that blanket absolute immunity should
not apply in peacetime military situations."' Rather, the courts in those cases
found it necessary to conduct a particularized inquiry into the officers' func-
tions and duties. By so doing, the courts properly applied the balancing
approach set forth in Butz, weighing the harm to the individual if recovery is
denied against the potential disruption to the military if the officer is held
liable. 219 The resulting principle is that during peacetime military officials are
afforded immunity only in situations where national security interests demand
complete insulation from liability. In those situations, the individual's recovery
interests are outweighed by national concerns.
By conducting a particularized inquiry in the Stanley case, the Supreme
Court would have realized that the facts before it did not implicate "special
factors counselling hesitation." The majority would have recognized that its
extension of absolute immunity to the entire military was erroneous. First, the
government did not present enough facts to the Court to determine whether
or not the officials were in a chain of command relationship with Stanley.2w
As Brennan pointed out, nowhere in the records were the respondents' offices,
titles or functions enumerated, nor was it conclusively established that they
217. 107 S. Ct. at 3077 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
218. See Tigue v. Swain, 585 F.2d 909 (8th Cir. 1978). In Tigue, an Air Force captain sued
the Little Rock Air Force Base hospital commander, an Air Force colonel, for libel and false
imprisonment after the captain had been confined for a psychiatric evaluation on a questionable
fact scenario. Id. Specifically, Tigue had refused to contribute money to a coffee mugs fund and
his troubles began. Id. at 910-12. The Eighth Circuit viewed the claim as a constitutional deprivation
of liberty without due process which should be evaluated under Butz. Id. at 913. The court
concluded that during peacetime military officers are not clothed in absolute immunity. Id. at
913-14. Instead, a particularized inquiry into the functions performed and the circumstances
surrounding that performance must be conducted before absolute immunity is granted. Id. See
also Alvarez v. Wilson, 431 F. Supp. 136 (N.D. II. 1977).
Similarly, in Alvarez, the district court did not believe that blanket inunuity for military
commanders was justified. Id. at 146. There a Navy Lieutenant filed suit against several Navy
officers alleging that they had violated his constitutional rights to due process and to equal
protection. Id. at 137. Specifically, Alvarez, a black Puerto Rican, was a member of a race
relations committee in the Navy. Id. at 138. He alleged that because of this membership he was
harassed and finally confined to the hospital for psychiatric evaluation. Id. at 139. The district
court rejected a broadly based military necessity argument as a justification for absolute immunity.
Id. at 145-46. Instead, both courts applied the balancing approach approved of in Butz. See also
supra note 87.
But see Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976). In Greer, the Court upheld a military regulation
which banned speeches, demonstrations and the distribution of literature on a military compound
without prior approval. Id. at 840. The Court based part of its analysis on the need for armed
forces to be ready to fight in combat should the situation occur. Id. at 838.
219. Tigue. 585 F.2d at 913; Alvarez, 431 F. Supp. at 146.
220. 107 S. Ct. at 3073 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
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all were military personnel.?' The concern over the officer-subordinate rela-
tionship and its effects on the military disciplinary structure were of paramount
importance in the Chappell decision.m If the claim here was premised on an
enlisted person bringing a suit against his immediate superior, then the Chappell
bar to Bivens recovery should have applied. If not, then Chappell should not
have been relied on. Brennan recognized this and suggested that Chappell
should not have been strictly controlling;23 rather it should have been recog-
nized for what it is-a narrow exception to the rule of qualified immunity.
The Chappell court indicated that it did not intend to foreclose all suits for
service-connected injuries.' The burden here should have been on respondents
tO prove that the suit should have been foreclosed because effective perform-
ance of their official functions demanded nothing less. The Stanley majority's
interpretation of Chappell ran contrary to this principle and thus resulted in
a violation of Stanley's constitutional rights.
The Stanley case should have been decided by evaluating the unique facts
presented. In so doing, the Court would have given due deference to the
Bivens-Chappell interplay and to the established rule of qualified individual
immunity. Such an approach would have resulted in a proper balance between
military and civilian jurisdictions. Such an approach also would have assured
that the immunity principles are applied correctly, and that military officials
are treated like all other government officials.
F. Human Experimentation-The Nuremberg Principles And The Right To
Privacy
The majority, focusing on military immunity, the "incident to service" rule
and like concerns, ignored the fact that Stanley was not engaged in a battlefield
training exercise. Nor was he engaged in training camp reviews designed to
keep the troops at combat-ready status at all times. Stanley was not even
engaged in non-combat administrative tasks. Stanley was an unknowing vol-
unteer in a program in which he was handled like a laboratory specimen to
221. Id. at 3070 (burden is on official to prove exceptional situation which demands absolute
necessity for official) (citing Butz, 438 U.S. at 507; Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 812
(1982)).
222. The primary concern in Chappell surrounded the chain of command question. Chappell,
462 U.S. at 304. There the Court specifically addressed the special nature of military life and the
military command structure, finding those to be dispositive factors. Id. But compare the majority
opinion, 107 S. Ct. at 3062 (Chappell was decided on factors other than officer-subordinate
relationship), with the dissenting opinion, 107 S. Ct. at 3073 (officer-subordinate relationship is
at heart of ChappeUl opinion).
223. Id. Brennan concluded that since the facts did not conclusively prove that the experimenters
stood in a direct officer-subordinate relationship with Stanley, the Chappell doctrine's primary
focus on that relationship was not matched in this case. Id. at 3072. Further, Brennan concluded
that there was no congressional activity to speak of in this case, as the Court found in Chappell.
Id. at 3077. Absent these two requirements, Brennan believed that Chappell should not have
controlled the decision. Id.
224. 462 U.S. at 304.
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be studied under a microscope, with total disregard for his human welfare.
Save for the cursory explanation in its first paragraph, the majority's analysis
curiously lacked any discussion of the injustices wrought upon Stanley. The
Court, by totally disregarding humane considerations, abdicated its responsi-
bility to abide by and develop the moral and legal code of human experimen-
tation. The Court ignored the experiment's similarity to the atrocities the
Nuremberg Code was designed to prohibit.m The Code is meant to apply to
all citizens, military and civilian alike. But the same United States military
which created the Code also acted in covert defiance of it in its 1950's drug
testing programs. The military sensed that its actions were not acceptable, and
made a conscious effort to keep all knowledge of the program from the
volunteers and the public?26 But rather than stop a program that the military
felt compelled to hide, the program instead was allowed to continue in full
force, unimpeded by the fact that the experiments were wreaking havoc upon
unwitting "volunteers."
The government justified its drug testing program as necessary to further a
vague national security interest. 2 The furtherance of national security interests
often requires strict military discipline and when the scenarios which implicate
these interests are given a specific context, such as the battlefield situationm
or the nation's decision to station troops in a hostile conflict,2 they are often
justifiable. Suits involving claims which allegedly impact on national security
concerns should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis and, when warranted by
such concerns, courts should extend absolute immunity to those involved.
If the Court fails to conduct a case-by-case analysis to evaluate suits such
as these, society might once again be faced with uncontrolled human experi-
mentation. The experimenters, cloaked with absolute protection because they
are members of the military, would have the freedom to perform the most
gruesome of experiments. The Court's current analysis ignored the need to
maintain strict standards with regard to human experimentation, a need
recognized in the Nuremberg Code. If Stanley is viewed as creating new
225. See supra notes 112-21 and accompanying text.
226. 107 S. Ct. at 3067 n.3-5.
227. Id. at 3067. See R. SERIRUL, MILITARY JUSTICE IS TO JUSTICE AS MKrrARY Music Is TO
Music 211 (1970) (military's age-old argument is based on the need to wage war successfully).
228. Early common law recognized that officers in command during wartime are not personally
liable for injuries resulting from their official acts. See Lamar v. Browne, 92 U.S. 187 (1876);
Ford v. Surgent, 97 U.S. 594 (1878); Dow v. Johnson, 100 U.S. 158 (1879). This exception to
liability has continued. See, e.g., Rotko v. Abrams, 338 F. Supp. 46 (D. Conn. 1971), qff'd, 455
F.2d 992 (2d Cir. 1972) (parents of soldier killed in Vietnam denied recovery).
229. See Mora v. McNamara, 387 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
934 (1967); Luftig v. McNamara, 373 F.2d 664 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 945 (1967)
(suits challenging legality of Vietnam conflict, brought by servicemen, were refused consideration
by Supreme Court). See also Sherman, supra note 5, at 546 (Supreme Court has denied certiorari
to wide variety of claims brought against constitutionality of Vietnam War and consequently has
furthered the war power granted to Congress, and enunciated in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 642 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring), as "nothing in the Constitution is
plainer than that the declaration of war is entrusted to Congress").
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precedent with regard to military liability, society may be catapulted down a
frightening path where heinous experiments could be conducted and justified
under the guise of military necessity.
In addition to the humanitarian concerns generated by the Stanley case,
there are important constitutional considerations. Stanley's right to privacy,
and his interest in his physical and mental integrity, were maliciously infringed
upon by the military.230 By focusing on absolute military immunity rather than
on the suggested factual analysis, the Court disregarded Stanley's interest in
this fundamental right. The Court's failure to recognize Stanley's right to
privacy in this egregious situation suggests that there are very few situations
involving the military in which the Court will recognize this right. The intro-
duction of a mind-altering drug into Stanley's system, without his knowledge
or consent, substantially infringed upon Stanley's physical and mental integrity.
If the Court could so nonchalantly dismiss this right in a situation this extreme,
it seems easy to imagine that the Court will have no difficulty with dismissing
the right to privacy in other areas. This presents as chilling an outlook as
does uncontrolled human experimentation.
Suits such as the one presented involve neither national security nor military
defense. Analyzing the facts of this case leads to the conclusion that the Court
should have placed its primary concern on the nature and effect of the violation
committed, not on Stanley's status as a serviceman. If evaluated in this way
and the violation is found to be of a heinous nature, a remedy attaches. If
the violation is not found to be heinous, no remedy attaches. In other words,
a resolution could be reached without any reference to the separate systems
theory when no national security interests are implicated. Individual relief
would be evaluated on an equal basis. Utilizing this alternative method would
result in a more equitable consideration of plaintiffs' claims. Plaintiffs who
were once productive, functioning members of society, and, as a result of
inhumane military activity, are now physically or mentally crippled would be,
at least, compensated monetarily.
IV. IMPACT
A. Denial Of The FTCA Claim
The Court's denial of Stanley's FTCA claim, although based on strict
procedural rules, seems to create an avenue for ignoring the purpose behind
the FTCA. The FTCA was designed to create a vehicle for suits against the
government. However, the Stanley decision could compel a court to conclude
that a finding of military status automatically precludes recovery. Surely this
undermines the remedy that the FTCA created. A governmental waiver of
immunity is meaningless if the exceptions to this waiver are expanded to such
an extent as to render the waiver nonexistent. The FTCA was not set up as
230. 749 F.2d 1530 (11th Cir. 1985). See also supra note 144.
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a blanket liability statute, nor should it now be negated by blanket immunity. 231
The section 2680(j) exceptions enumerated by the legislature serve as a pro-
tective mechanism for the government. m Likewise, the Feres exception created
by the judiciary serves as a protective mechanism for the governmentY31 But
construing either the legislative or judicial exceptions too broadly undermines
the delicate balance of interests that must be evaluated before deciding whether
or not to impose liability.
The judicial exception should be narrowly construed and then automatically
applied only to those factual paradigms that are identical to the situation in
Feres. Automatic application to cases that are dissimilar to Feres only serves
to sabotage the remedial purpose behind the FTCA. Such a development
would return us to the abandoned and indefensible doctrine of absolute
sovereign immunity. Instead, an automatic bar to FTCA recovery should be
limited to claims arising in the course of combat duty, as section 26800) states.
All other claims should be analyzed separately to determine whether the nature
of the claim mandates or precludes recovery.
B. Denial Of The Bivens Claim
Just as the Court's denial of Stanley's FTCA claim foreshadows a return
to the rejected sovereign immunity doctrine, the Court's denial of Stanley's
Bivens claim seems to signal a return to absolute immunity for a wide range
of government officials. Prior to Stanley, certain government officials were
entitled to qualified immunity, and, where certain facts demanded, the poten-
tial for absolute immunity existed.13 Thus, immunity was being applied only
after a careful analysis of the different functions and duties of the different
officials. The Stanley decision undermined this carefully developed scheme.
Absolute immunity will now be granted to the military at the beginning of
the case, precluding any examination of the facts whatsoever. It appears that
all military officials will now be exempt from all prosecution based on Bivens
claims.
The Court's broad definition of the "incident to service" term, coupled
with its expansive reading of the Chappell "special factors" exception, provides
military officers with an inordinate amount of freedom. Granted, some free-
dom from fear of reprisals is necessary for proper military effectiveness because
troops must be ready and willing to respond to orders instantly. But this need
should not extract so high a cost as to force servicemen to relinquish their
constitutional rights upon entering the military. Prior cases have shown that
231. See supra notes 19-24 and accompanying text. Cf. Note, Governmmt Immunity, supra
note 20, at 1089-90 (liability created should be balanced with immunity created by exceptions).
232. See supra notes 23-24.
233. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. See also Stauber v. Cline, No. 86.4233 (9th
Cir. Jan. 20, 1988) (claim barred because activity viewed as incident to service under Feres); Major
v. United States, No. 86-6226 (6th Cir. Dec. 16, 1987) (suit dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction because of Feres principles).
234. See supra notes 41-72 and accompanying text.
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an unchecked military is a fertile field for intentional, negligent, and consti-
tutional tortsy 5 To stem the growth of these abuses, the Court must maintain
a supervisory role over the military. The Court must balance the military's
interest in autonomy against the individual's interest in constitutional protec-
tion. Only after performing such a balancing test can the courts equitably
determine whether the specific factual situation warrants qualified immunity
or absolute immunity.
Applying a balancing test would assure that the military sector would be
judged by the same standards as other sectors of society. Should the courts
ignore this balancing approach and apply Stanley's absolute immunity doctrine,
the separate systems theory will flourish once again. 6 The military will then
be free to make decisions unencumbered by the checks and balances which
regulate all other sectors. Upon entering the military, an enlisted person would
lose the protections afforded to civilians, and thus surrender the rights he is
fighting to protect.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Stanley addressed two
distinct claims, both of which it denied. First, by barring reinstatement of
Stanley's FTCA claim, the Court prevented Stanley from recovering from the
government. The Court's denial, based on strict procedural grounds created
more problems than it solved because it undermined the express purpose of
the FTCA. Second, by barring Stanley's Bivens claim, the Court prevented
him from recovering from individual government officials. The Supreme
Court, consequently, chipped away at the qualified immunity concept and
increased the distance between the civilian and military courts. The Court's
holding is not supported by legal precedent, history or the needs of modern
society. The lower courts will determine the breadth of Stanley's impact,
however, and one can only hope that its impact will not be too widespread2 7
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235. See generally supra notes 74 & 83 and accompanying text. See also SHERRn!, supra note
227, at 192 (there is no shortage of places to look for condoned brutality in the military).
236. See Hirchhorn, supra note 3, at 254. "What does remain, it must be admitted, is alien to
our basic concepts of humanity and law an aggregation, now numbering two million people,whom
Congress, in accordance with the political process, may treat as if they exist only to be used."
Id.
237. It appears as if other parties have come to the same conclusion as this Casenote and have
recognized the Stanley decision for what it is-an error in justice. For example, in October, 1988,
the CIA was close to settling a lawsuit with nine Canadians who had been the unwitting participants
in mind control experiments sponsored by the CIA. See CIA Near Settlement of Lawsuit By
Subjects of Mind-Control Tests, N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1988, at 6, col. 5-6. The Times article
reported that the two parties were close to concluding a $750,000 settlement agreement. While the
CIA steadfastly clung to its belief that the settlement in no way represented that it or the
government were liable, the opposing counsel described the settlement as proof that "no part of
our Government is above the law."
